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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF R. Daniel McCauley for the
Master of Arts in History presented December 4, 1985.
Title:

Wilhelm Reich's Character Analysis in its Historical
Context.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Go(°.j~ Dodds

The thesis is an attempt to reconcile contradictions
and devise historical meaning from a problematic text.

The

book is Wilhelm Reich's Character Analysis, first published
in 1933.

This influential psychoanalytic work embodies both

a radical social theory and disturbing authoritarian
attitudes.

The thesis uses a variety of methodologies, in

particular Roland Barthes' techniques for ascribing

2

historical meaning to certain formal qualities of writing.
The thesis proceeds from a summary of methodological studies
in intellectual history and criticism, including those of I.
A. Richards, R. G. Collingwood, and Dominick LaCapra, as
well as Barthes, to a description of Character Analysis and
its various historical contexts - biographical, social, and
intellectual.

The thesis relies on the authoritative

biography of Reich, by Myron Scharaf, on autobiographical
accounts by Reich's wife and son, on other texts in
psychoanalytic social theory by Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm,
Herbert Marcuse, Georges Bataille, and Max Horkheimer, and
on secondary scholarship on the origins of National
Socialist ideology.

The thesis argues that despite the

influence of reactionary tendencies in Reich's personality
and cultural and social milieu, Character Analysis remains a
valuable work in the development of a convincing theory of
liberation.
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CONCLUSION •••

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This essay is an exercise in eliciting meaning from a
text.

The book is Character Analysis, written by Wilhelm

Reich over the years 1925 to 1948. It is a classic of depth
psychology and radical social theory. The significance of
Reich's work lies in his advancing a conception of mind
which subsumes both physiological processes and social life
into

an

integrated

reconciles

the

theory

of

complex,

reason1

and

contestatory

which

also

discourses

of

psychoanalysis and communism. It is a theory in the process
of development,

and the text

reflects

this.

A fragment,

describing a decade of clinical work and political activity,
was first published by Sexpol-Verlag in Berlin in 1933 as
Characteranalyse.

The final

expanded edition appeared

in

New York in English in 1949. This contains clarifications
in the forms of notes, reminiscences, polemics, new clinical
studies, and innovations in terminology.
I have chosen to discuss this particular book not only
because of

its philosophical

affect.

is

First,

It

Reich

moving
has

and

written

significance,

convincing
Character

passionate commitment to rationality1

in

but

also

peculiar

Analysis

its

ways.

with

a

and he has applied

2

this

to

unmasking

a

interrelationship among
madness,

and

argument,

he

compelling
sexual

unfreedom.
often

mystery

repression,

Also,

surprises,

in

the

-

the

sadomasochism,
course

disorients,

and

of

his

presents

problems to the reader. This is partly due to the author's
implicating
Formally,

diverse

Character

types

of

Analysis

writing

is

at

and

intentions.

a

wide-ranging

once

theory and a pastiche; so shocks and disjunctures appear in
the course of the text. For example, Reich's basic concern
is

to

encourage

psychoanalysts

to adopt a controversial

technique; this is to attack at a certain point in therapy
not the words and the memories their patients carry of the
past, but their present demeanor, manners, physical bearing,
their very bodies, and, above all, their sexual abstinence.
And he pursues what appears to be a strictly scientific
argument here. But this rigorous discourse opens onto an
intensely dramatic and personal narrative - the case study
of

his

attempt

to cure

a

young

shizophrenic;

moments onto an utopian communique -

at

other

a metapsychological

prescription against oppression and conflict; and even onto
an image of transcendence - of the structure and purpose of
the cosmos. Another aspect of the strange appeal of this
text is its luridness. At its center, Reich has placed a
complex of assertions about sexual orgasm, which includes
such

relatively

descriptions,

inappropriate

boasts

and

statements

confessions,

as

clinical

idealizations,

and
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dicta for politically correct sex acts. On occasion, these
seem to the reader attempts to map out a strategy for the
scientific and ideological domination of the most private
behavior. Reich also writes in Character Analysis with a
generous

respect

psychotics7
both

indeed,

himself

and

for

the

experiences

and

opinions

of

he has the disturbing knack to bring
his

reader

into

patients' madness. And finally,

collusion

with

his

the argument of Character

Analysis comes to seem to this reader quite fantastic, while
still maintaining its conviction and importance. The text
is writing that, by its virtues, its rigor, universality,
ambition, and radicalness, is at once self-destructive and
liberating. All these are compelling reasons for examining
and amplifying Reich's text in an effort to understand it.
I

hope

to

elucidate

these

aspects

of

Character

Analysis by situating the book historically. This is only
indirectly an attempt to trace the influences on the text,
its intellectual and social determinants,

or

its general

impact. Instead, I want to attempt a more limited, perhaps
personal,

kind

of

historical

understanding

of

Character

Analysis by comparing similarities and differences between
it and analogous pieces of writing. I have selected these
additional texts also for their personal affect, as well as
for

their

common

concerns,

modes

of

expression,

and

relationship in time to Character Analysis. They include,
for

example,

Max

Horkheimer's

Eclipse

of

Reason,

which

4

parallels Reich's effort to understand the political and
social crises of the twentieth century from a psychoanalytic
perspective; Reich's own
was

written

clarifies

the

~

concurrently
sociological

Psychology .Qf Fascism, which

with
and

Character

Analysis

political aspects

and

of his

work; and Ilse Ollendorff Reich's biography, which documents
her husband's experiences and intentions.
This comparison of texts will hopefully evoke meaning
because they share a climate of opinion, a world-view. They
are bound together by their relationship in time as well as
their

similar concerns into a field of discourse.

other writings compose a

temporally

illumined

These

scheme

of

contexts within which Character Analysis might be placed.
This scheme includes one context made up of statements about
Reich's experiences and intentions;

another of statements

that can be arranged into the tradition of discourse within
which Reich wrote,

which includes the psychoanalytic and

Marxist critiques of fascism; and one of statements which
impinge

referentially

or

instrumentally

upon

common

institutions, political events, and other facts of social
life. The historical meaning of Character Analysis resides
where it and these contexts intersect.
But gaps, disjunctures, both in Reich's writing and
this field of discourse, are also meaningful. The variety
of

critical

perspectives

conflicting textual milieu.

on

fascism

creates

an

often

And as far as texts refer to
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moments outside themselves, to events and institutions that
have concrete existence,

these exist and endure, and also

change and disappear within any historical period. So some
possibilities

for

statements,

meaning,

certain

complex

and

are

relationships

fractured.

between

Horkheimer's

discussion of the relationship between psychological needs,
reason,

and

forms

of

political domination made

different

sense in 1947, after the war against fascism, than Reich's
in 1934,

in the midst of

revolution.

They take on still

additional significance from the perspective of the present
-while for two decades unrestrained narcissism has been a
practical form of resistance to racism, militarism, and the
fragmentation
course,
another.
about

of

both

love

writers'

into

commodity

statements

They are part of a

reason,

society,

and

relationships.

Of

connect with

one

still

continuing radical discourse
human nature.

Also,

Character

Analysis was written in confrontation to other texts and
real events.

It was the culmination of disputes with both

psychoanalysts and socialists. And finally, Reich wrote it
with instrumental
world,

intent -

sometimes

to make

fantastic,

things

utopian,

happen
absurd

in

the

things,

absolutely contrary to the commonplace sense of reality. He
attempted to argue the world he desired into being.
tends

to appear

to

the

reader as

the

This

criticism of many

political, psychoanalytic, and scientific ideas as forms of
domination.

Consequently,

these

gaps,

extensions,

open
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spaces in the field of textual statements have meaning as
potential sites of empowerment.

In his text, Reich seizes

upon contradictions, whether between Marxist and Freudian
theory

and

experience

practice,
of

between basic

living

in

Central

human needs

Europe

in

the

and

the

1930's,

between reason and conventional constraints, within bodies
which function against themselves, or within a madness that
makes

sense,

as

opportunities

for

liberation,

for

dispersions and redistributions of power. And this, too, is
historically meaningful.

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Before proceeding to describe Character Analysis more
closely,

I

want

to

review some current opinions on the

status of the methodology of the history of ideas and the
criticism of significant texts, and clarify what I intend by
historical meaning. For I am using a number of disparate
notions

from

twentieth

century

writers,

from

R.

G.

Collingwood to Roland Barthes, as well as Reich's own sense
of

the

relationship

among

mind,

memory,

the

past,

and

present concerns. These various notions do share, however,
a conviction about the extent to which historical thinking
is autonomous. It is a kind of fiction or poetics that is
made meaningful by the historian's imaginative power. This
includes her or his abilities to enclose the past in its
relevance

or

its

distance,

to

invest

the

present

with

qualities of mind, and to visualize the future with hope.
History is, at least in part, determined by the status of
the historian as his own subject.
For example, Collingwood argues in

~ ~

.Q.f History

that any intellectual historian's knowledge of the past is
necessarily based on an assumption about the unity of human
thought.

This

concept

is

an ancient

and pervasive

one.

8

Collingwood translates its classical formulation into terms
of the logical dependence of present mental acts on previous
ones, of a chain of ideation through time.
Ever since Plato in the Timaeus said that time is the
moving image of eternity, philosophers have for the most
part agreed that there was sane relation between [time and
reason and the] necessary sequence by which cne thing leads
to another in a nm-temporal logical series. If this is
denied, and if it is maintained that temporal sequence and
logical implication have nothing to do with each other,
historical knowledge becanes inpossible, for it follows
that we can never say about any event "this ~ have
happened"; the past can never a~r as the ccnclusion of a
logical inference. If the temporal series is a mere
aggregate of disconnected events, we can never argue back
from the present to the past. But historical thinking
consists precisely of arguing back in this way; and it is
therefore based on the assumpticn that there is an internal
or necessary connecticn between the events of a time-series
such that ooe event leads necessarily to another and we can
argue back from the seccnd to the first. en this principle
there is only cne way in which the present state of things
can have cane into existence, and history is the analysis
of the present in order to see what this process must have

been.I

With Collingwood,

historical

thinking

is validated on a

similar, but somewhat more limited, logical basis. For the
historian, the

~resent

shares an identity with the past as

the certain sum or composite of a continuum of moments, but
distilled to acts of pure mind.
acknowledge
political

favorably
theorist

the

view

Michael

Collingwood proceeds to
of his

Oakeshott,

contemporary,
that

the

historical

thinking is thus "a perfectly genuine experience." What the
historian
Is experiencing is going en in his mind now; in so far as
he places it, as it were, at arm's length fran him in the

past, he is misconceiving it; he is arranging in imaginary
pigeon-holes of past time what is actually all present and
not past at all. And this does not imply that he is making
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historical mistakes about the past. There is no past,
except for a person involved in the historical roode of
experience7 and for him the past is what he carefully and
critically thinks it to be. He makes no mistake gya
historian: the only mistake he makes is the philosophical
mistake of arranging in the past what is actually all
present experience ••••
[This] entirely vindicates the autonOII¥ of historical
thought. The historian is master in his own house7 he owes
nothing to the scientist or to anyone, else. And this house
is not built and furnished out of mere ideas of his own
which may or may not correspond with the ideas of other
historians or with the real past which they are all alike
trying to know7 it is a house inhabited by all historians,
and it consists not of ideas about hi.story, but of history
itself.2
History, then, is radically contemporary7 it is created7 it
is always what the historian makes it1 and it is meaningful
in the sense it shares a continuously renewed identity with
all acts of mind.
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has daie
in the past, and at the same time :Lt is the redoing of
this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present. Its
object is therefore not a mere object, sanething outside
the mird which knais it7 it is an activity of thought,
which can be known only in so far as the knowing mind reenacts it and knows itself as so doing. To the historian,
the activities whose history he ls studying are not
spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived
through in his mind7 they are object:lve, or known to him,
only because they are also subjective,. or activities of his

own.3

Collingwood' s

view tends to minimiz1e the factness of the

past. History is possible as the sympathetic repetition of
thought events.
reason,

by a

It is imbued with meaning by the unity of

basic

identity

of

human

thought

throughout

time. But it is primarily an act of imagination, performed
with presence and presentness of mind.
These dicta on the logic of historical thinking are
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related to one significant aspect of what has most commonly
been written in this century as the history of ideas. The
typical

intellectual

historian

constructs

a

line

of

development through past facts and ideas toward some more
contemporary
Rudolph H.

and

relevant

theory,

or

Weingartner clarifies this tradition

Philosophic Comments on Cultural
chosen

viewpoint,

"fairly

arbitrarily"

in

"Some

Weingartner has

Hif:~tory."

texts:

thn:~e

taste.

Edwin

E.

Lowinsky, "Awareness of Tonality in the Sixteenth Century•,
1961; Herbert Butterfield, "The History of the Modern Theory
of Gravitation•,
Gothic

Revival

summarizes
briefly.

1952;
and

"the

and Arthur

the

Return

historical

He then proceeds

o.

Lovejoy,

to

Nature",

substance"

of

"The First
1932.

each

of

He

these

"to discuss the nature of the

subject matter of each of the samples",

"to focus on the

types of connection said by [these] historians to hold among
the

different

elements

of

their subject matter•,

and to

"take up the problems of causality and influence in cultural
and intellectual history.•4
His basic observation of the subject matter of these
texts

is

that

ordinary

actions

products

of

like;

they
or

various

that is,

are

only

events,
kinds

they are

of

minimally

but

concerned

instead

with

intellectual

concerned with

what

activity

similarities

with
the
look
and

differences among ideas. These histi:>r ical accounts do not
touch upon the usual

concomitants

of

activity

-

neither
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individual

motives,

professional

psychology,

life.

and

Weingartner

aims,

nor daily and

suggests

that

such

disinterest by these writers in character and the conditions
of work, but exclusive emphasis on formal descriptions of
certain special features of the works themselves, indicate
an unusual view of causality.
The formal relationships these intellectual historians
describe among various ideas are complex. But they are all
viewed from the standpoint of the present. Both Butterfield
and Lowinsky are interested in abstract conceptions that
predate

and

resemble

certain

currently

admired

ideas,

specifically, Newton's cosmology and the tonalities of the
classical

canon

from Bach to Beethoven.

Lovejoy selects

statements about design and nature that compose a unified
correct taste. And he proceeds to describe a relationship
between a change in taste and a change in the meaning of the
concept of nature. Lowinsky describes an advance in musical
composition in the sixteenth century, an increase in the
number and complexity of triadic hc:Lrmonies over time.
also categorizes

these

formal

He

elements against those of

another competing development of chi:omaticism. Butterfield
describes how the work of a century of individual scientists
provided a variety of propositions and methods that Newton
was able to select out and bring together into a universal
theory of matter and motion.
Weingartner insists that the historians cannot mean
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these relationships among the formal aspects of individual
intellectuals' works to be causal in the ordinary sense. He
points out that causal arguments of the type of a chain of
multiple

events

subsequent

to

one

another

are

rare

and

dubious.
The world is not made in a way suitable for the isolation

of causal chains. Because too many things exercise causal
influence on other things, the accounting for an occurence
(E) by reference to a causal chain (back to A) will in most
cases seem arbitrary and unilluminat:Lng. In so far as it
is furthermore implied that E is the product onl_y of D and
D of C (and so on), the account is simply false.sAlso,

causality

inappropriate

for

is

extremely
describing

dif:Eicult
groups

to

of

prove

and

artists

and

scientists.
Coomunities of this kind do not consis:t simply of works and
workers, but inclooe at least such :institutions in which
artists or scientists are trained and those by which their
works are used in various way. • • • .Anyone who takes the
problem of influence seriously has a difficult task to
perform. It is hard work to establish a claim to the
effect that sane feature of a work is the product of an
influence of an earlier work having a certain feature. It
has to be shown that the author of the later work was
indeed familiar with the earlier, that he noted in sane
appropriate way the relevent feature, that he was not also
familiar with sane third work possessing sane other
feature, or at least that his own work was not produced
under the influence of such a third work, that he did not
cane to give to his work the feature that he did
independently of any previous works, and probably quite a
bit more.6
Weingartner

asserts,

rather,

that

works

in

intellectual history have an interest and meaning regardless
of the problem of causality.
We share with the authors of these essays an interest that
is .m.U. geoeris, one that is satisfied in knowing what the
stages were in the develcpnent of a carq;>lex feature. We
are quite content to ignore or take up at another time the
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questicn of what brought it about.7
It

seems,

also,

imaginative

that

acts

this

of

interest

is

history-making

similar
that

to

the

Collingwood

describes. The connection among a variety of musical forms
over

time

divested
logical

or
on

among

contingent,

sequence

historian

different

of

recreates

conceptions

factual

ideations
from

his

causes,
through

of

mechanics,

suggests
time

standpoint

which

solidly

in

that
the
the

present.
This

distinction

between

causation

and

a

logic

appropriate to historical thinking is further elaborated by

w. H. Walsh in his essay "The Causation of Ideas." Walsh
observes that it is the usual business of historians to take
ideas at more than their face

valuE~,

to "see them not as

self-subsistent entities, but as effects which bear witness
to their causes and deserve attention just because of that
fact. 11 8 And as with Weingartner, the precise nature of this
relationship concerns him. It is not causation in what he
calls the Humean sense - as "two items which are separately
describable and in which instances of the first sort are
found

in

constant

conjunction

with

instances

of

the

second.•9
But certain other, less precis:e, relations involving
ideas are meaningful. For example, historians often discuss
ideas as related to unspoken assumptions, to a climate of
ideas. Clearly, this includes the relationship among ideas
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within a common period of time. In this kind of argument,
historians demonstrate that
Saneone who believed R could not do so unless he also
believed g, and then sh<M that thei~e is good reason to
suppose that he did believe g, or took it silently for
granted. Fundamentally, what is i.n question here is
logical argument rather than causal reason.. • • The climate
of ideas in which they move cert:ainly affects men's
thoughts, but not as an independent causal agent. It is
better described as informing their thoughts •••• Reference
to it is enlightening because it calstitutes the standing
background of assumptions against which particular ideas
were formed.le
Walsh

goes

on

to

argue

that

what

intellectual

historians might seem to consider causes of ideas outside
the sphere of ideas political

forces

-

for

are,

example,

in fact,

social,

not.

economic,

or

They are at base

relations of thought of the same type as that between an
idea

and

its

intellectual

climate.

Material

and

social

situations do not affect ideas in and of themselves, but are
mediated by the thinking individuals' perceptions of these
situations1

and

possibilities.

such

perceptions

Consequently,

involve

"the f<>rming of

the

options,
idea

is

not a mechanical effect of the envisaging of a situation,
but rather an appropriate response to it.•ll
Quentin Skinner, in "Meaning and Understanding in the
History of Ideas",
thoroughgoing
historians.

turns

critique

For

Skinner,

this kind of connection into a

of

the

met:hods

historical

of

meaning

intellectual
emerges

the diversity among ideas and contexts over time.
It is the vecy fact that the classic:: texts are concerned
with their own quite alien prd:>lems, and not the

from
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presumpticn that they are somehow concerned with our own
problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie but
the key to the indispensable value o.f studying the history
of ideas. The classic texts, eJcpecially in social,
ethical, and political thought, help to reveal - if we let
them - not the essential sameness, but rather the essential
variety of viable moral assumptions and political

camdtments. It is in this, moreover., that their essential
philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie.12

Skinner's essay is a series of cautions against presentism,
what he considers an unhistorical, fallacious, banal mode of
thinking. These include contaminati·on "by the unconscious
application of paradigms whose familiarity to the historian
disguises an essential inapplicability to the past"; "sheer
anachronism•, whereby •a given writer may be 'discovered' to
have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity
of terminology, on some subject which he cannot in principle
have meant to contribute"; the "mythology of doctrines" mistaking "some scattered or incidental remarks by one of
the classic theorists for

his

'doc:trine'

on one of the

themes the historian is set to expec:t•; and the "danger of
the historian conceiving his task to be to supply or find in
the text a coherence they may seem to lack." "This whole
repertoire of Einfluss-studies is based on nothing better
than the capacity of the observer to foreshorten the past by
filling

it

with

his

own

reminiscences. •13

Skinner's

alternative view of intellectual history is of a discipline
which restricts its meaning to delineating the intentions of
textual statements possible within the precise time of their
production.
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Skinner's essay has engendered a recent controversy in
methodology.

For

example,

Joseph

V.

Femia,

in

"An

Historicist Critique of 'Revisionist' Methods for Studying
the History of Ideas", has ascribed to Skinner a series of
propositions which he considers mostly dubious:
(i) In the sphere of political/social reality, there are no
universal truths or perermial questioos; all systems of
ideas correspood to specific phr.ases and orders of
experience; (ii) past thought must bE! c00q;>letely dissolved
into its precise context (culture, situation, and so
forth); it possesses no capacity for independent life;
(iii) the intellectual historian should not concern himself
with the validity or present signif:Lcance of past ideas;
texts must not be regarded as vehiclE!S for the exercise of
the analyst's own preoccupations; (iv') historicity demands
that we focus on what an author co:nsciously intended to
say; and (v) no subsequent account of a thinker's
enterprise could survive the demonstration that it is
itself dependent on the use of anachronistic criteria of
descriptiai and classification - criteria which, in other
terms, would have been unintellig:Lble to the thinker
himself .14
Femia suggests that Skinner's proposition (i)
of

an

historiographical

misusing of Husserl.

commonplace.

The

is something
others

are

a

He proposes, in turn:

(a) Ideas nay enshrine much that is1 of pernanent value,
even though they themselves are untrue or obsolete; b)
thinkers do indeed work within intellectual traditions,
which - to ~ extent transcend particular contexts; (c)
all history is "caitemporary histoi:y", dictated by the
interests of the historian; study of the past is valuable
only insofar as it throws light on. present proolems or
needs; (d) it is neither necessary ncJr desirable, fran an
historicist perspective, to understand a body of thought
µ.irely or even primarily in terms of t:he author's conscious
designs.15
Femia argues that some problems and questions recur in
the history of ideas due to the exi,stence of a "permanent
substratum of all philosophizing",

or

human nature.16 In
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addition, •particular authors usually think and write in a
way that they regard as relevant to what their predecessors
wrote.•17 To whatever extent any text is determined by the
time

and

place

and

social

situation

of

authorship,

an

ahistorical, individual element is nevertheless present as a
residue,
These

transcending

include

contexts.

contemporary

conditions

of

life.

ideals and values th.at are useful

Finally,

reflection

on

the

in new

act of writing

as

cognition and creation reveals how this can be so, how texts
involve more

than

intention

and

context,

and why

their

reconstruction is meaningful.
Although an idea is the product of the thinking which went
into it, it also transcends that thinking. There may be
logical relations between a person's ideas which do not
correspald to any psychological rEuations between the
thought processes which led respect~rely to those ideas logical relations of which he may be tmaware.18
Dominick LaCapra, in "Rethinking Intellectual History
and Reading Texts•, argues a carefully modulated criticism
of Skinner, who holds what he terms a documentary view of
historical thinking. The documentary includes the facts of
the text,

its literal assertions;

, relationship

of

the

text

to

it also refers to the

empirical

reality.

LaCapra

suggests that the writing of the his:tory of ideas is more
than this; it is •a subtle interplay between proximity and
distance in the historian's

relation to the

study.•

themselves

history.

Texts

hold

within

the

'object•

of

totality

of

They are

A situated use of language marked by a tense interactiai

~-
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between mutually implicated yet contestatory tendencies.

en this view' the very awositicn between what is inside

and what is outside texts is rendered prcblematic, and
nothing is seen as being purely inside or outside texts.
Indeed, the problem then becomes cne of rethinking the
ccncepts of "inside" and "outside" in relaticn to processes
of interaction between language and the world •••• For the
historian, the very recoostructioo of a "context• or a
"reality• takes place on the basis of "textualized"
remainders of the past.19

In short, the intellectual historian never simply confronts
the past, the context and intentions of a great piece of
writing,

as

a

pure object,

something

observed, and reconstructed. Rather,

to be

discovered,

he or she is always

engaged with the text, a very part of it, within a process
of discourse. Also, interesting texts are resistant to the
kind

of

historical

reconstruction

Skinner

advocates

by

virtue of their uncommonness, "the exceptional way in which
they address commonplace themes", in which they •engage in
processes that employ or ref er to ordinary asssumptions and
contest

them.•20

This

applies

not

only

to

the

ordinary

notions of the time within which a text was created, but
also the tradition. LaCapra names this conception of texts
the work-like. "The work-like supplements empirical reality
by adding to, and subtracting from,

it.• It includes "the

roles of commitment, interpretation, and imagination•1 and
it •engages the reader in re-creative dialogue with the text
and the problems it raises.•21 The work-like aspects of the
text also engage the historian in attempting
To think further what is at issue in a text or a past
"reality•, and in the process the questioner is himself
questicned by the "other.• His own horizoo is transformed
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as he coofronts still living (but often submerged or
silenced) possibilities solicited by an ilquiry into the

past.22

LaCapra proceeds to name and describe six different
contexts within which a piece of writing is situated. It is
the intellectual historian's task both to document and to
work

at

the

importance.

tensions

The first

relation between

~

within

these,

and

their

relative

context LaCapra discusses

author'~

intentions .Sl.Wi

objects that Skinner's view of

this

•tends

~

is

·~

text.• He

to assume a

proprietary relation between the author and the text as well
as

a

unitary

analysis

meaning

might

go

for

beyond

an

utterance.•23

this

to

Historical

discuss

multiple

intentions, contradictions, or ambivalence on the author's
part. This comes out of a sense of writing as the process
of creating out of experience - which is polymorphous - both
latent and surface meanings.

Skinner's prescription also

ignores the possibility of a community of discourse around
the text, the extent to which the author's intention is only
one among all those who have commented or reflected upon it.
That is, it discounts the aura of the text; it limits the
power of readers to respond to a text, enrich it, and create
an extended tradition.
Second, is
~

~.•24

9

The relation between

LaCapra warns

that

~ author'~

this

is not

l.i.f..e. .s.rui

merely an

analogous relationship, in which aspects of life and writing
directly reflect one another; rather, these might •be worked
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or played out differently in each, and these differential
relations
Also,

pose

writing

important

problems

is

merely

not

for

interpretation.•

imitation,

but

also

supplementing, an over-abundance. Texts "add something to
the ordinary life that as a matter of (perhaps unfortunate)
fact might not exist without them. 11 25
Third,

"~

is

.Qf

relation

society

to

Again, this is not merely a matter of analogy.

texts.•26

It is

That of now precisely the discursive practice, deep
structure, or ideology - even the prejudice - is situated
in the text other than in terms of instantiation or simple
reflection.27
Those

aspects

of

the

text

that

are

conditioned

by

the

specific time of its composition intersect those that are
common

to a

long

tradition and

those

that

are

special

moments of originality. These new moments represent in a
complex

text

escapist,

the

interplay

"imaginary

between

compensation

aspects

for

the

that
defects

are
of

material reality•, and those that serve •the contestatory
function of questioning the empirical in a manner that has
broader

implications

(prescriptions)

for

the

leading

of

life. 11 28
Fourth, is "~relation of culture to texts.•29
It is not enough to establish influence or the existence of
a shared "paradigm" through the enl.lllleratioo of carmcn
presUtp)Sitions, questions, themes, or arguments. One must
elucidate in a more precise and detailed way how the
borrowed or the ccmncn actually functions in the texts in
question.30
Fifth,

is

·~

relation Qf

s

llxt .t.Q .the. corpus Q.f A
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writer. •31 LaCapra warns that discontinuities in the body
of

work

of

a

explorations,
himself.

writer

might

self-criticisms,

Finally,

is

·~

be
or

intentional,
ironies

relation

by

between

explicit

the

writer

modes

.Q.f

discourse and texts. •32 Here, La Capra is concerned with
self-referential aspects of a text, those statements which
concern the text's own mode of production.

These include

formal qualities of the writing, as well as restrictions and
rules

for

proper

statements.

The

historian

needs

to

determine how the canons for purity are established, and
what contradictions or tensions are excluded or suppressed
by such rules.
This concept of the rules of discourse points to a
special view of historical thinking, one that is in respects
more radically critical than Skinner's,

that reduces the

logical interrelationship of facts and ideas through time to
a mere

convention,

structuralists.

In

•structuralism and
Sande

Cohen

and which has
a

discussion

the Writing of

asserts

that

conventional and hypostatic.

been

taken

by

French

of

this

tradition,

Intellectual History•,

historical

statements

are

Chronology merely

sustains all other levels of historical discourse,
including descriptioos, assertioos, naming of cootiguities
between facts, elenents of sequence and simultaneity, the
search for discontinuities between perioas.33
Yet the chronological relationship of events is in itself
empty of any concrete meaning. That B followed A in time
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does not explain anything about either A or B.
Historians 'touch' the objects of their discourse only by
recourse to the already-meant; hence, every shred of
historical meaning belongs to the discourse and not to the
objects.34
This hypostasis is related to the function of historical
statements as instruments of persuasion,

instruction,

and

domination. Code and convention function to restrict the
domain

of

thoughts,

appropriate
feelings,

statements

and

enforce

particular

and values. This view opens up a new

range of historical inquiry.
In place of asking •what did that mean?•, an historian can
ask •how did a past generate a plethora of significations
which historians can choose for historical remenbrance?•
This shift entails that just as one •denaturalizes•
historical discourse by trying to write without benefit of
conventional meanings, one must •denaturalize• historical
objects and model them as past productions of sense which
becane conventions in historical time and entered into a
host of differing intellectual functions.35
Such rules,

constraints,

conventions exist as meaningful

residues in any system of discourse and in any text. The
structuralist prescription for the intellectual historian,
then, is to delineate the rules by which a text makes sense
and how these came to be used as instruments of domination.
The

structuralist

tactic

for

analyzing

texts

is

linguistic specifically, the use of the sentence as a basic
model

for

both

texts

and

non-verbal

events.

This model

suggests two kinds of relations in any system of meaning.
In addition to the rules or conventions by which meaningful
relationships

are

constructed,

there

is

the

world-view
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within which an audience perceives statements, texts, and
events.

The

first

limits

the

domain

of

allowable

operations, combinations, analogies; the second defines the
field

of

•interpretable

Consequently,

meanings

and

connotations.•36

the object of analysis is not so much the

content, but how the making of sense happens by means of the
text. This occurs as a saturation, an interpenetration of
form, assumptions, and statements, both within the text and
among other texts and events in the social world.
Perhaps the most important figure in this tradition is
Roland

His

Barthes.

literary

criticism

emphasizes

historical residues of form that express negation, those
aspects

of

a

text

that defy commonplace notions,

crude

conventions of domination, and instead release fantasy and
dreams of liberation. For example, in Writing Degree

~'

Barthes attempts to describe certain self-conscious aspects
of modern literature, which appear only to refer to the
writing itself,
alienated

but which actually reveal writing as an

activity,

and

which

thus

contain

an

implicit

critique of bourgeois social relations.
It is impossible to write without labelling oneself ••••
[Literature] must signify something other than its content
and its individual form, something which defines its limits
and ~s it as Literature, whence a set of signs
unrelated to the ideas, the language or the style, and
setting out to give definition, within the body of every
possible mode of expressioo, to the utter separateness of a
ritual language. This hieratic quality of written signs
establishes Literature as an institution and clearly tends
to place it above history, for no limits can be set without
some idea of permanence. N<M it is when History is denied
that it is most unmistakably at work; it is therefore
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possible to trace a history of literary expressicn which is
neither that of a particular language, nor that of the
various styles, but simply that of the signs of Literature,
and we can expect that this µirely formal history may
manifest, in its far from obscure way, a link with the
deeper levels of history.37
Although the self-referring moments of literature are the
most transparent, others general

the interstices of structural,

limits to writing -

also signify alienation and

liberation. Barthes names these limits as language, style,
and mode. Language is the compendium of rules and practices
which the writers of a particular historical period share.
It

is

the boundary within which written statements must

remain in order to make sense.
SUspended between forms either disused or as yet unknown,
the writer's language is not so much a fund to be drawn on
as an extreme limit; it is the geometrical locus of all
that he could not say without, like Orpheus looking back,
losing the stable meaning of his enterprise and his
essential gesture as a social being.38
Style is the personal, idiosyncratic, almost physiological
aspect of writing.
[Its] imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body
and the past of the writer ard gradually becane the very
reflexes of his art.... Its frame of reference is
biological, not historical: it is the writer's "thing",
his glory, and his priscn, it is his solitude, indifferent
to society and transparent to it, a closed perscnal
process, it is in no way the product of a choice or of a
reflecticn on Literature. It is the private portion of the
ritual. It rises up from the writer's ~laden depths
and unfolds beyond his area of control. It is the
decorative voice of hidden, secret flesh; it works as does
Necessity, as if, in this kind of floral growth, style were
no more than the outcane of a blind and stubborn
metamorphosis starting fran a sub-language elaborated where
flesh and external reality come together.39
Mode describes the temporally limited choice a writer makes
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among intentions, ethics, political commitments, naturalness
of expression, and other considerations •of the social use
which he has chosen for his form•.
Thus the choice of, and afterwards the responsibility for,
a mode of writing i:x>int to the presence of Freedom, but
this Freedom has not the same limits at different nanents
of History. It is not granted to the writer to choose his
mode of writing fran a kim of non-tenp:>ral store of
literary forms. It is under the pressure of History and
Traditiai that the possible modes of writing for a given
writer are established; there is a History of writing. But
this History is dual: at the very manent when general
History proposes - or imposes - new problematics of the
literary language, writing still remains full of the
recollection of previous usage, for language is
never innocent: words have a second-order memory which
mysteriously persists in the midst of new meanings.
Writing is precisely this carpranise between freedan and
rement>rance, it is this freedan which remerrbers and is free
only in the gesture of choice, but is no laiger so within
duration. True, I can today select such and such a mode of
writing, and in so doing assert my freedan, aspire to the
freshness of novelty or to a tradition; but it is
impossible to devel~ it within duration without gradually
becaning a prisoner of someone else's words and even my
own. A stubborn after-image, which canes from all the
previous nodes of writing and even fran the past of my own,
drowns the sound of my present words. my written trace
precipitates, as inside a chemical at first transparent,
innocent, and neutral, mere duratiai gradually reveals in
suspension a whole past of increasing density, like a
cryptogram.
Writing as Freedan is therefore a mere manent. But
this manent is one of the most explicit in History. Since
History is always and above all a choice and the limits of
this choice.40
One mode in Barthes' history of writing is important, here.
This

is

Marxist

specialized,
enclosed,

writing,

technical

wherein

vocabulary

totally natural world.

the

attempts

choice
to

of

a

define

an

This vocabulary has the

effect of imposing •a stability in its explanations and a
permanence in its method•, as well as always expressing a
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consistent set of value-judgements.41 But this closure also
binds it to a specific praxis, which is, •in the present
state

of

History•,

one

of

domination1

and

like

"any

political mode of writing can only uphold a police world.•42
This contradiction points to the basic dilemma of writing in
the present era. The potentiality of writing as freedom, as
an

absolutely

good

moral

choice,

is

restricted

by

the

present social reality and the structural limits of writing
itself.
Within
constraint,

the

dynamic

certain

formal

of

writing

properties

as
of

freedom
the

and

text,

its

subversive moments, are especially meaningful. One of these
is its fugue-like nature, which Barthes elaborates in his
essay

"From

Work

to

Text.•

A meaningful

text

defies

classification. It represents, instead, •a serial movement
of

disconnections,

overlappings,

variations•,

which

"coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy. •43 That
is, elements of the text, whether of form or content, are
interwoven in such a unique way, they throw the reader into
a special

state of confusion,

back upon his or her own

psychic resources. It requires the reader to enter into the
actual construction of the text. so it is, on a deep and
cooperative basis, an empowering of the reader.
'Ihls means that the Text requires that ooe try to abolish
(or at the very least to diminish) the distance between
writing and reading, in no way by intensifying the
projectioo of the reader into the work, but by joining them
in a single signifying practice.44
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In

The

Pleasure

.tM

Qf

.l'..llt.,

elaborates this psychology of reading -

Barthes

further

not as cognition,

but as erotic liberation. This is achieved by what he terms
the redistribution of language.
Such redistributioo is always achieved by cutting. '!Wo
edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing
edge (the language is to be copied in its canonical state,
as it has been established by schooling, good usage,
literature, culture), and another edge, mobile, blank ready
to assurre any contours), which is never anything but the
site of its effect: the place where the death of language
is gl~. These two edges, the conpromise they bring
about, are necessary. Neither culture nor its destructioo
is erotic7 it is the seam between them, the fault, the
flow, which becanes so.45
Characteristics of this cutting edge of the text include
shocks,

excesses,

disturbances,

the

loss which is proper

to ecstacy, the split that is an overcoming of "the moral
unity

that

extravagant

society

demands

originality

statements which

avoid

of

or

being

every

human

repetition,
ideological

by

product",
uncompleted

leaving

the

reader hanging, a "subtle subversion, what is not directly
concerned with destruction, evades the paradigm, and seeks
some other term:
synthesizing

a third term, which is not,

term,

but

an

extraordinary

however,
term",

a
an

interrelatedness, by which "reading and the risks of life
are

subject

to

the

same

psychoanalytic typology,
the

hallucinated

encountering

of

form
the

anamnesis.•46

"linking the
of

reader's

the

This

is

a

reading neurosis to

text. •47

individuality

affects, frictions, and open spaces of the text.

It

is

within

the
the
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In this regard,

I

want to note also

I.

A.

Richards'

Practical Criticism, a pioneering work in the problem of the
relationship between a text and the variety of individual
readings it might elicit.
with

developing

approaches

this

intelligence

and

a
by

Richards'

criteria
defining
sensibility

for
a

concern is primarily
judging

typology
possible

poetry.

He

of

failures

of

in

a

critical

reading.
'llle root question is whether responses reflect the poem

itself, or sane private poem prompted by the material set
before the reader and by his CMl'l reminiscences.48
What

are

significant,

here,

are

the

categories

of

this

typology, which, in a digression, Richards applies to any
text,

and particularly to texts of scientific discourse,

such as Character Analysis.
It is plain that most hlllllall utterances and nearly all
articulate speech can be profitably regarded from four
points of view. Four aspects can be easily distinguished.
Let us call them Sense, Feeling, Tone, and Intention ••••
If we survey our uses of language as a whole, it is
clear that, at times, nCM one nCM another of the functions
may become predominant. It will make the possible
situations clearer if we briefly review certain typical
forms of canposition. A man writing a scientific treatise,
for example, will µit the sense of what he has to say
first, he will subordinate his feelings about his subject
or about other views upon it and be careful not to let them
interfere to distort his argument or to suggest bias. His
tone will be settled for him by academic convention7 he
will, if he is wise, indicate respect for his readers and a
moderate anxiety to be understood accurately and to win
acceptance for his remarks. It will be well if his
intention, as it shCMs itself in the work, be on the whole
calfined to the clearest and most adequate statement of
what he has to say. But, if the circlllllStances warrant it,
further relevant aims - an intention to reorientate
opinion, to direct attention to new aspects, or to
encourage or discourage certain methods of work or ways of
a~roach - are absolutely fitting ••••
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Consider now a writer engaged upon popularizing some
of the results and hypotheses of science. The principles
governing his language are not nearly so simple, for the
furtherance of his intention will properly and inevitably
interfere with the other functions.
In the first place, precise and adequate statement of
the sense may have to be sacrificed to some degree, in the
interests of general intelligibility. Simplifications and
distortions may be necessary if the reader is to "follow.•
secondly, a much more lively exhibition of feelings on the
part of the author towards his subject-matter is usually
awropriate and desirable, in order to awaken and encourage
the reader's interest. Thirdly, more variation between the
expert and his lay audience must be created, and the task,
as many specialists have discovered, is not easy. These
other functions will interfere still more with strict
accuracy of statement; and if the subject has a •tendency",
if tx>litical, ethical, or theological implications are at
all praninent, the intention of the work will have further
opportunities to intervene.49

A correct
analysis

of

reading

how

these

throughout the text.
extent

it

is

authenticity of

or

meaning

characteristics

happens
are

by

an

patterned

Such an analysis is valuable to the

integrated,
experience.

reflecting
This

an

individual

is especially a problem

with the category of feeling.
If we canpare our IX7t1ers of analyzing sense and feeling we
shall recognize at once that feeling, in contrast with
sense, is a will-o'-the-wisp. we have a marvelous
ag;>aratus of inter-engaging and overlawing synbols for
handling and elucidating sense, a logical machine of great
sensitiveness and IXJWer, equipped with autanatic safety
devices and danger signals in the form of contradictions.
Logical language has even reached such a high state of
developnent that it can now be used to improve and extend
itself, and may in time be made self-running and even foolproof. For handling feeling we have nothing at all
canparable. we have to rely utx>n introspection, a few
clumsy descriptive names for emotions, some scores of
aesthetic adjectives and the indirect resources of tx>etry,
resources at the diSIX>sal of a few men only, and for them
only in exceptional hours. Introspection has become a
byword, even where intellectual and sensory products and
processes are concerned, but it is even more untrustworthy
when a:g>lied to feelings. For a feeling even more than an
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idea or image tends to vanish as we turn our introspective
attentiai upon it. we have to catch it by the tip of its
tail as it decamps. Furthermore, even when we are
partially successful in catching it, we do not yet know how
to analyse it. Analysis is a matter of separating out its
attributes, and no aie knows yet what attributes a feeling
ma¥ have, what their system of interconnections is, or
which are important, which trivia1.s0
An attempt at such an analysis of feeling has been
made by the American literary critic Norman H.

Holland,

using

Holland,

the

meaning

insights

emerges

from

of

depth

the

psychology.

transformation

For
of

unconscious

drives into conscious affects. This is a function of form.
Writing and reading typically release erotic fantasies and
guilt anxieties, as they simultaneously displace these to
language and understanding, as defensive reactions.
our caiscious attention shifts from the content of the
utterance (which is presl.llllably sensual, and containing deep
erotic associatiais, indeed well-spring) to its form.
Attention, concern if you will, psychic energy, are taken
away from substance and given to language.... such a
displacement weakens our involvement with the deeper,
fantasy levels, fraught with fear and desire1 fil_Stead, we
concentrate our involvement on the verbal leve1.s
The affective meaning of a text is a fugue, a movement along
the range of discontinuities defined by fantasy content and
literary form.
I have gone into these notions of Barthes, Holland,
and Richards about the nature of literary response to an
extent

perhaps

inappropriate

for

understanding

Character

Analysis, a text of scientific prose. But in the course of
discussing Character Analysis,

a

similar

concept

of

the

patterning of explicit, conscious, yet powerfully evocative
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statements about sexual orgasm and repressed drives with an
unusually

wide

distributions

of

variety

of

formal

language,

for

an

strategies,

expository

text

of
will

hopefully help situate Reich's work within a general history
of human liberation.
I also want to note Hayden White's view of the status
of historical statements. He asserts that history is made
entirely of free creative choices1 it is iconic narrative,
or poetry1 and its meaning is wholly contained within its
mode of representation. White suggests a typology of form
for history, by which a contextual methodology, which this
essay will attempt to follow, implies a liberal ideology and
an

ironic

world-view

relativist.
contexts

By

are

this

diverse

self-critical
strategy,
and

and

relationships

explainable

ethically
between

functionally.

So

Character Analysis, in its conviction, its contradictions,
its patterning of language, will be understood as providing
a technique for hope, redress, and critique of the dominant
social system.

It will be explained as justification for

certain decisions Reich made in his personal life, and as an
instrument

in

his

own

psychic

adjustment

to

reality.

Generally, why events occurred
Is to be explained by the revelation of the specific
relationshiJ?S. they bore to other events occurring in their
circumstantial historical space •••• In this operation the
aim of explanation is to identify the "threads" that link
the individual or institution [or work] under study to its
specious sociocultural "present. 11 52
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It seems it is possible to hold an ironic viewpoint
with

rigor

and

critical

self-consciousness,

while

questioning White's sense of an historical time as a purely
imagined, specious object. Social processes might be real
informants of a text. The world is certainly composed of
made

objects

artifacts,

institutions,

and

human

relationships. Over time, men and women act cooperatively and, it would seem, both consciously and unconsciously - to
change these. The production of a text belongs to the same
historical

process.

It bears the marks

individual

creation and

its

general

not only of

type,

but

also

its
the

special features of its time, the particular face presented
by particular aggregates of men's and women's thought and
activity. These represent autonomous choices. But they are
also definable by their temporal unity. Character Analysis
represents

a

singular

act

of

writing:

classifiable as a narrative, a polemic,

it

is

also

and a scientific

argument. It is especially a chosen position - a critique
of capitalism, politics, and sexual morality, but engaged
with its own time. As such, it shares a particular social
milieu and climate of opinion about reason, the human body,
and

freedom.

Certainly,

this

is

the

view

of

historical

meaning Reich himself expresses in Character Analysis.
In his positicn as the object of his needs, h<Mever, man is
also and at the same time the subject of history and of the
social process of which he "himself is the author", not, to
be sure, exactly as he would like to be, but under definite
economic and cultural presuppositions, which determine the
content and outcome of human action.53
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All these features of Character Analysis meet in the
formal qualities of the text - along the erotic edges of
writing which Reich creates out of the aspirations, limits,
and contradictions of his life and his age.

And again,

these consistently signify liberation. In short, I am using
varied methodologies as tools for delineating a particular
pattern by which Reich espouses freedom throughout Character
Analysis. Following Richards and Holland, I am attempting
to connect formal peculiarities of the text to my personal,
emotional, even idiosyneratic responses in order to elicit
an

authentic,

attempting

convincing

to

describe

reading.
how

After

certain

of

Barthes,
these

I

am

literary

characteristics might be historical evidence of the basic
liberating value of Reich's writing. My use of Barthes is
crucial.

Whatever

inconsistencies

of

authoritarian

attitudes appear in Reich's text, my position is that these
are overcome in the formal,
work.

Following

Walsh,

liberating qualities of

Femia,

and

LaCapra,

I

hope

the
to

suggest how events in Reich's life, his cultural and social
milieu,

and

his

contradictions
Weingartner,

generation
and

I

want

might

liberating
to

suggest

have

informed

aspects.
that

these

Following

Character

Analysis

contains certain similarities and differences compared with
a number of other texts. These other texts also examine the
relationship

between

sexuality

and

political

domination.

34
They help place Reich's work within a discourse, within the
context

of

liberation.

the

historical

After

development

Collingwood,

I

want

of
to

a

theory

believe

I

of
am

creating an image of the past validated by its continuity
with

the

present

-

endures through time.

with

an

objective

rationality

And like Reich at his best,

which
I

see

this rationality as the hope and strategy for freedom and
tolerance.
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CHAPTER III
BIOGRAPHY AND TEXT
Perhaps the most disconcerting intersection between
Character Analysis and its various contexts is where Reich's
sympathy for his patients in the book seems to emerge from
his own emotional struggles.I Throughout his life,
was

himself

a

person

in

trouble.

So

Character

Reich

Analysis

represents a radical interpenetration of life and text, by
which the author's personal experience becomes a special
kind of evidence for his argument. Events in Reich's life
also have their formal correllative in the text. This is
the pattern of self-references in Character Analysis which
indicate both the self-justifying anger of a lonely man and
his

basic

life-long

impulse

toward

liberation.

Consequently, I am going to describe Reich's book first and
foremost in relationship to the story of his life.
Wilhelm Reich was born on March 24, 1897, in Galicia,
and grew up in the Austrian Ukraine. His father Leon was a
free-thinking Jewish businessman and farmer,
cattle

under

contract

to

the German army

raising beef
on

his

large

estate. He was proud, short-tempered, jealous, and brutal
to his family and his workers.
SOcially, the loog arm of [his] father was often felt.
Reich was not allowed to play with peasant children nor
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with Yiddish-speaking Jewish children. '!be father ai;:pears
to have been socially very ant>itious, consorting with
government officials and other high-level persons, but
Willy's opportunities for playing with peers were scarce.
The feudal quality of the life is further revealed by a
story Reich told his second wife, Elsa Lindberg. As a
child he was not permitted to take part in village dances.
But one night, while he was watching the dance, a peasant
boy threw a stone at him. Willy told his father and Leon
hit the boy's father. So, quite early, Reich was exposed
to the brute EXMer not only of the father in the home but
of the property owner in the corrmuni ty, and he experienced
both in ways that would mark him.2
During
and,

his childhood,
according

to

Reich resisted this difficult man1
his

third

wife,

Ilsa

Ollendorff,

resentments continued throughout his life.
Reich talked very little about his relationship with his
father. I have the feeling that it was a very ant>ivalent
relationship, because on more than one occasion Reich tried
to inply that he was not really his father's son, that
maybe his mother had a relationship with one of the
Ukrainian peasants - a rather unlikely story for that time
and place - and in the end, went so far as to offer the
even more unlikely proposition that he was the offspring of
his mother and a man fran outer space.3
But he also held onto positive memories of his father.
Reich took great satisfaction in the fact that his father
was not religious, aside from some ritual Jewish
observances to a~se more orthodox relatives1 that Leon
was cosmopolitan in orientation and mqdern-minded in his
farming practices1 that he was a working property owner,
not a "parasite." In later years Reich stressed that his
mother, too, was very active on the family estate, a leader
who helped organize the wanen's work on the farm just as
the father directed the men.4
His

mother

Cecilia

was

a

very

beautiful

woman,

a

good

housewife, unintellectual according to family tradition, and
deeply loved by her son.
All through his life Reich idolized his mother. No other
wanan's cooking over the years, for example, could ever
reach her perfection. Elsa Lindenberg, Reich's second
wife, told me that she was never able to make an apple
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strudel just like his mother used to make, and no matter
hCM hard I tried I could never produce a special cabbage
dish that he liked exactly the way his mother had made it.
I once came close when I slightly burned the cabbage, and
ever since I have had my private doubts about Mrs. Reich's
perfection as a cook.s
However contradictory Reich's deep feelings for
parents were,

the

his

eccentric charm of these anecdotes of

burnt cabbage and lovers from outer space imparts a soft
light on his childhood.

It was in many respects idyllic.

Reich often spoke with a certain nostalgia of his childhood
years on the farm. He rement>ered especially the young
Ukrainian girls who were his nursemaids, their earthiness,
and the warmth with which they cuddled him. He remerrbered
the folk songs they used to sing, and the folk dances in
which he sometimes participated. He told of the large
fishponds where carp were raised, and although he liked to
eat freshly caught freshwater fish, he never liked fishing,
and thought of it as a cruel sport. He used to say that it
always made him think of a great big giant dangling a juicy
steak in front of a ht.nnan, only to hook the poor htnnan on a
sharp barb the manent he was tempted to take a bite. He
remenbered riding for hours over the fields, surveying the
harvest, and enjoying the smell of the fields, and the
newmcMl hay.6
This idyll did not lack a sexual dimension.
He rement>ered as a boy of four sleeping in the servants•
room when his parents were away. On several occasions, he
overheard or witnessed intercourse between a maid and her
boyfriend. In the course of these experiences, he asked
the maid if he could "play" the lover. He stressed to one
informant that she permitted him to do so in a very helpful
way. Without stimulating him actively, she allowed him to
move on top of her. Whether this ha~ed once or often is
uncertain. But Reich clearly attributed great importance
to his relationship with this peasant girl. He once said
that by the time he was four there were no secrets for him
about sex, and he related this clarity in part to his
sexual play with his nursemaid.7

An equally significant place in his memories was held by a
remarkable tutor, as Reich disclosed in a third-person voice
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autobiographical narrative he published in 1948.
WR' s interest in biology and natural science was created
early in his life on the farm, close to agriculture,
cattle-breeding, etc., in which he took part every sunmer
and during the harvest. Between his eighth and twelfth
years, he had his own collection and breeding laboratory of
butterflies, insects, plants, etc. under the guidance of a
private teacher. The natural life functions, including the
sexual functioo., were familiar to him as far back as he can
remerrber. That may very well have determined his later
strong inclination, as a biopsychiatrist, toward the
biological foundation of the emotional life of man, and
also his biophysical discoveries in the fields of medicine
and biology, as well as education.a
These anecdotes also mask a complex of tragedies, a
core

of events,

"an existential debt all the rest of a

lifetime. 11 9 Their fanciful aspects are more than the quaint
and

hazy

breakdown
committed

memories
of

of

words

suicide

when

childhood;
and
he

they

are

remembrance.
was

fourteen,

a

meaningful

Reich's
after

mother
he

had

revealed to his father her real love affair with this tutor.
Reich published and even more complicatedly voiced narrative
of the affair as a case study in his first clinical article,
"The Breakthrough of the Incest Taboo in Puberty", in 1920.
The tale is told within a purported letter by a patient to
Reich1 in reality, the patient is an imagined persona for
Reich, himself. This patterning of imagination and clinical
evidence, self and vocation, has a meaningful decorum.
N {name of tutor) began to court her, stimulated by walks
they took together. He apparently became ever bolder as he
recognized how things were going - the jealous scenes, etc.
between ~ parents, and the fact that mother liked him. At
the beginning I was not canpletely clear about the
developing relationship. But I began to follow them when I
noticed mother going into his room when father nai;:.ped after
lunch. In part I was erotically curious, in part I was
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filled with fearful thoughts that father would wake up.
And from then on I played .m& and wrsuer, but at the same
time also defender (italicized by me - the analyst) against
any surprises from father. I cannot clarify further the
reasons for rqy behavior. Either it was unconscious hatred
against rqy father or sexual titillation to be aware of such
stunning secrets about which rqy father remained ignorant.
I believe that both factors were equally responsible for rqy
behavior.
The relationship between rqy mother and tutor grew
ever deeper; not a day passed in which they did not seek
and find the opportunity to be alone ••••
Shortly after Christmas father went away for three
weeks and I experienced the most horrible, the most
upsetting events, which burned themselves deeply into rqy
feelings and thoughts.
Mother slept, as always during father's absence, in
the last bedroom on the corridor. After that came our
room, then the dining room, and then his (N's) room. Right
on the first night (I was so tense I had not closed rqy
eyes) I heard rqy mother get up and - the horror grabs me by
the throat 1 - heard her slippered walk and saw her, clad
only in a night gown, pass through our room. SOOn I heard
the door of his room open and not canpletely shut. And
then quiet.
I sprang up from rqy bed and followed, shivering, rqy
teeth chattering from anxiety, horror, and cold; I moved
right up to the door, which was only partly closed, and
listened. Oh horrible memory, which tears rqy rement>rance
of rqy mother to dust, her memory always besmirched anew
with dirt and muck 1 Must I then say everything? The pen
bristles, no, rqy ego, rqy whole being is against it, and yet
I will and must write on.
I heard kisses, whispers, the frightening noise of
the bed, and on it lay rqy mother. And a few yards away
stood your son and heard your shame •. suddenly quiet. I
had evidently made a noise in rqy excitement, for I heard
calming words from him and then, then again, oh! (The last
sentence, especially the last words, written a~rently in
the highest excitement, with heavy strokes of the pen.)
Only quiet, quiet toward this nerve-shattering
tragedy, in order to accomplish the superhuman! To judge
objectively! What a mockery! What a resolution!
From that catastrophic night I rement>er only that rqy
wish at first was to plunge into the room but I was held
back by the thought: they will kill youl
I had read somewhere that lovers get rid of any
intruder, so with wild fantasies in rqy brain I slii;ped back
to rqy bed, rqy joy of life shattered, torn apart in rqy
inmost being for rqy whole life!
SO it went, night after night; always I slii;ped back
and waited till morning. Gradually I became used to it!
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horror disappeared and erotic feelings wen the ua>er
hand. And then .tm thought came to ~ to plunge into the
.IQQID, ,grui .tQ ~ intercourse with ~ mother with the
threat tbst .if. n didn '.t .I would tell ~ father.
For my part, I went regularly to the chani:>eana.id.10
The

It was not uncommon for Freud and his followers to
fictionalize

their case histories

to

some

extent

and

to

project their personal memories into them. And the origins
of

this letter must

authentic,

perhaps a

analysis under
literary

remain obscure.
document

It might be largely

from Reich's

own,

abortive

Isidor Sadger. Or it might be primarily a

object,

epistolary novel.

perhaps

an

imitation

of

the

romantic

In either case, it contains a series of

significant edges, disjunctures, displacements to language.
The general movement of the piece is indicated in the
second

sentence,

one

of

increasing

boldness

and

self-

recognition toward fulfillment in the boy's fantasies and
his

mother's

betrayal

of

the

core

oedipal

situation.

Ambiguity is introduced by a self-referring break in the
narrative's movement,

the parenthetical aside "(italicized

by me - the analyst)", that is both a confusion of persona
and

a

suspension

attention

to

intensifies,

a

of

affect by transferring

formal

matter.

As

the

the

reader's

sexual

a number of rhetorical flourishes

drama

intervene,

which in their literariness do not so much express feeling
as fend off the imminent erotic climax.

o horrible memory, which tears my remercbrance of my mother
to dust, her memory always besmirched anew with dirt and
muck! Must I then say everything? The pen bristles, no my
ego, my whole being is against it, and yet I will and must
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write on.
The excesses, here, the repetitions of the word memory and
of the allusions to filth, as well as the formal emphasis on
hesitation

in

the

stop and

go

diction,

are

parried

by

another matter of fact intervention by the analyst persona.
('.lbe last sentence, especially the last words, written
ag;>arently in the highest excitement, with heavy strokes of

the pen.)

The most significant formal residue is the affectless tone
of the final statement, nFor my part, I went regularly to
the chambermaid.• Reich's patient persona abruptly assumes
the matter-of-fact attitude of the analyst. Not only does
this sentence seem to be an after-thought, an anti-climax
that is being tossed aside 1 it also signifies a complex
historical

attitude.

By

domination,

the objectification of the servant as a mere

recourse, an instead-of,

one

reading,

a useful

it

might

receptacle for

suggest

Reich's

blocked passion for his mother, but of no consequence in and
of herself.

Formally,

the sentence resembles the reified

discourse of instrumental science. But this radical change
of tone creates a more complex -edge. The simplicity of the
statement,

reflecting

the

diction

of

the

analyst,

also

suggests a turn to reason, even cleanliness, a purification,
after the emotional and rhetorical excesses of the oedipal
fantasy.
Of course, it also represents a diversion from a very
real,

unrelenting tragedy.

Cecilia's suicide was a drawn
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out and horrible one. Unable to envision divorce or flight,
she

endured

her

husband's

recriminations

and

increased

brutality for two years, until in 1909 she drank a household
solvent, died after several days of great pain, left Reich's
father

devastated.

Father

and

son

became

very

close,

perhaps by virtue of their shared remorse, but only for a
brief time.
Only the thought of his two sons kept him fran taking his
own life. He insured his life heavily and afterward
caitracted µieurnaiia, standing for hours in cold weather in
a pond, ostensibly fishing. The_pnelll'OOilia developed into
tuberculosis and he died in 1914.ll
The

insurance for

company

his

suspected

sons was never

suicide.

In

the

recovered,

end,

as the

Reich's

younger

brother Robert assumed financial responsibility for the two
impoverished young men during Wilhelm's student years; and
the

strain

very

likely,

or

at

least

so

Reich

felt,

precipitated his death by tuberculosis in 1926.
A two-sided

meaning

emerges

from

this

incredible

family tragedy and the contradictions in Reich's memories of
it,

and

finds

its

sexual activity,
Reich both

the

way

into

Character

Analysis.

the tender female embrace,
final

recourse

of

life

First,

remains with

and

an

absolute

justification for forgiveness. And second, words are a much
more

problematic

elusive;

form

of

human

expression.

They

are

they have the power to mask the truth, unleash

suffering, and bind remorse. These two assumptions form the
foundation of Reich's psychoanalytic theory. His career was
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to move psychoanalytic technique beyond words into physical
processes.

They

reflect

a

combination

of

powerful

experiences - of sensuous peasant girls, a beloved mother, a
hard

father,

a young boy's confused attempt at truthful

utterances and good faith, and their tragic consequences.
These events gave to Reich's psychoanalytic career a
powerful

impetus.

After

his

discharge from

the Austrian

army in 1918, Reich entered the University of Vienna as a
law student1 but he switched to medicine before the end of
his first semester. With Otto Fenichel, Reich organized an
extracurricular seminar on sexuality. This led to studying
psychoanalytic

writings

and

an

introduction to Freud in

1919. By early 1920, Reich was seeing patients Freud

had

referred to him, and in the summer he became a guest member
of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, at the remarkable age
of twenty-three.
Finishing medical school in 1922, he became the first
clinical

assistant

at

the

Psychoanalytic

Polyclinic

in

Vienna, which Freud had established to provide therapy to
working

class

people,

laborers,

farmers,

clerks,

and

students. Reich observed in these patients a different form
of emotional disorder than Freud had treated in his middle
class clients. Instead of typical symptom neuroses, such as
obsessive-compulsive habits or hysterical paralysis, Reich
found generally disorganized lives and anti-social and selfdestructi ve tendencies. Also in 1922, Reich suggested and
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Freud supported the establishment of the Technical Seminar
for

Psychoanalytic

encountered

Therapy.

young

Failures

analysts

in their practices were discussed

under

the

leadership of an experienced therapist. Reich assumed this
position

in

1924

and

held

it

into

1930.

Reich's

theoretical innovations, his development of psychoanalysis
beyond symptom analysis to the systematic treatment of the
entire character as a biological entity, came out of his
experiences in the Polyclinic and the Technical Seminar.
Reich dealt with
coming

across

in

their

problem of

resistance.

resistance

explains

associations
repressed

the

individual

practices

In Freud's work,
the

basically

memories.

failures young analysts were

impediments
as

the

Overcoming

fear

under

the

the concept
to

of

resistance

free

verbal

touching
is

a

of

upon

crucial

point in classical psychoanalytic theory.
If we comnunicate to a patient some idea which he has at
cne time repressed but which we have discovered in him,
our telling him makes at first no change in his mental
coodition. Above all, it does not reroove the repression
nor undo its effects, as might perhap:; be expected from the
fact that the previously unconscious idea has now becane
cooscious. Ql the contrary, all that we shall achieve at
first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea ••••
Actually there is no lifting of the repressioo until the
conscious idea, after the resistances have been overcane,
has entered into connection with the unconscious memorytrace. It is only through the makin~ conscious of the
latter itself that success is achieved.
That is, the patient must not only know and understand his
burdensome

memories,

he

must

re-experience

them

as

recollection and the consequent release of cathectic energy.
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Reich extended the concept to include the production of too

much material with no emotion.

Patients

tended to offer

deceptions and trivialities in order to please the analyst
out of politeness, while defending themselves against the
pain and deep feelings that are consequences of cure. Even
authentic verbal material was often merely translated into
new

symptoms

and

classical theory,

deeper

levels

of

the

disturbance.

In

resistance is overcome by transference,

the emergence of the analyst as a new object-cathexis, to
reactivate erotic strivings, overcome repression, and make
conscious

their

association

essentially broke with Freud

with

the

past.

Reich

in arguing that the affect

produced by remembering repressed material was insufficient
to bring about cure.

Transference and remembrance in the

analytic situation, he argued, was secondary to establishing
a

permanent

object-cathexis

a

fulfilled

romantic

relationship in the patient's daily life.
For Reich observed that
sexual

activity,

consistently

both

past

his
and

patients'
present,

related to the success or

patterns
were

failure

of

more

of their

analysis than any pattern of words.
We learn from analytic practice that sane cases,
notwithstanding protracted and copious analysis, remain
refractory; whereas other cases, despite incanplete
examination of the unconscious, can achieve lasting
practical recovery. In coopiring these two groups, it
turned out that, after the analysis, the former cases,
namely those which remained refractory or readily relapsed,
had not succeeded in establishing a regulated sexual life.
In an investigation of the prognosis of average cases, it
was further shown that, under otherwise equal caiditions,
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the chances of cure were that much more favorable the more

canpletely genit:rj- primacy had been achieved in childhood
and adolescence.I
Reich developed a therapeutic procedure that attacked

directly

physical

patients'

his

bearing,

strained

mannerisms, and polite lies into which their natural sexual
expressiveness
sensed

that

had
the

been

channelled

neurotic's

apparent

and

suppressed.

niceness

He

concealed

attitudes of doubt and distrust toward her or himself, the
analyst, and life in general. He raised this contradiction
by

forcing

their

anger

and

ultimately

encouraging

the

integration of their passion into genitality. He abandoned,
here,

Freud's

principle

of

strict neutrality toward his

patients. Instead, he criticized and mocked them - going so
far as to manipulate them physically, to attack the knotting
and atrophying

of their musculature,

defenses

against

character

armor,

erotic
a

their

sensations.

concept

by

He

which

physiological
treated

he

their

described

a

functional, integrated distortion - a physical crippling, an
attitude, and an entire mode of existence.
In the analysis, the neurotic character traits as a whole
prove to be a canpact defense mecbanism against our
therapeutic efforts, and when we trace the origin of this
character •armor• analytically, we see that it also has a
definite econanic function. such armor serves on the one
hand as a defense against external stimuli; on the other
hand it proves to be a means of gaining mastery over the
libido, which is continuously pushing forward fran the id,
because libidinal and sadistic energy is used up in the
neurotic reaction formations, canpensations, etc. Anxiety
is continually being bOlllld in the processes which are at
the bottan of the formation and preservatiai of this armor
in the same way that, according to Freud's description,
anxiety is bound in the canµllsive symptoms.14

50

The

character

armor

represents

a

systematic

typology,

relating specific emotional disorders, character types, and
regions of the body where blocked erotic energy accumulates.
The

treatment

liberation,

of

the

armoring

allowed

not

but also the freeing of the body for sexual

potency. Reich discovered that after the
been

only psychic

addressed,

armoring had

after

the

character

been attacked and

resistances had

and

dissolved,

its

physical

the

important

childhood memories, the Oedipus complex and castration fear,
came

forth

patients.

more
In

easily

and were

addition,

emanating from outside,

they
like

honestly

faced

experienced
germs

or

by his

symptoms

social

as

pressures,

rather than as part of their selves. They became able to
deal

with

the

blows

of

the

world

with

courage

and

to

distinguish the erotic strivings inside their bodies with
hope for fulfillment.
The

basis

of

this

physiology

of

emotions

is

radical valuing of silence.
Orgaie therapy, as opposed to all other f orrns of therapy,
attempts to influence the organism not through the use of
hlllllan language but by getting the patient to express
himself biologica1ly. This approach leads him into a depth
which he coo.tinually flees. In this way the orgone
therapist learns, understands, and influences the language
of the living organism. It is hardly possible to obtain
the primacy language of expressioo of the living protoplasm
in the patient in a "µire" form. If the patient's mode of
expression were biologically "pure•, he would have no
reason to seek the help of an orgone therapist. we have to
go through a welter of pathological, unnatural expressive
movements (i.e., movements not native to the process of the
living organism) to arrive at the genuine biological rnode
of expression. Human biopathy, indeed, is nothing other

the
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than the sum total of all the distortions of the natural
modes of expression of the living organism. By urunasking
the pathological modes of expression, we get to knCM hmnan
biopathy at a depth inaccessible to methods of cure
operating with hmnan language. This is not to be ascribed
to a deficiency on the part of these methods; they are
adequate in their own spere. With it§ distorted expression
.Qf ~' howeyer, biopatqy lies outside the sphere of
language and ideas.15

Reich is asserting in Character Analysis that every human
attitude,

gesture,

and

utterance

are

the

functional

expression of a physiological process. This process is the
flow of sexual energy. It occurs beyond words and conscious
intentions.

Indeed,

mediations

the

it

is

generally

experiences

of

twisted

social

within

life,

its

learned

perversions, deceptions, and restraints. It is transformed
within layers of words and memories into anxiety, neurosis,
and disease. It is authentic only as the silent, autonomous
release of orgasm which is the convulsive expression of the
core of the human body, silent and imageless. Reich views
this as a significant departure from psychoanalysis.
The orgasm is not a psychic phenanenon. <il the contrary,
it is a phenanenon brought about solely by the reauction of

all psychic activity to the primal vegetative function,
i.e., precisely by the suspensiai of psychic fantasizing
and imaginative activity. It is nonetheless the central
problem of i;sychic ecal011¥. Its inclusiai in psychology
not only permits a concrete treatment of the quantitative
factor in psychic life and the establishnent of the
cormection between the psychic and the physiological factor
(i.e., vegetative factor). over and above this, it leads
of necessity to a significant change in the psychoanalytic
view of the neurotic process. Formerly, the Oedipus
canpl.ex was regarded as an explanatiai of neurotic illness.
Today we realize that whether or not the Oedipus canplex
leads to neurosis depends upai other factors: the childparent caiflict does not becane pathogenic unless there is
also a disturbance in the child's sexual econany; this
early disturbance lays the groundwork for the subsequent
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ma.lfunctiming of the libido econany in adulthood; it
derives its energy precisely fran what helped to bring it
about, i.e., the stasis of genital-sexual energy. In this
way the accent was shifted from the contJRt of the
experience to the economy of vegetative energy.
Certainly,

Reich,

who intends to convey in writing

both a radical departure from accepted theory and a reality
which resides in silence, faces serious formal difficulties,
both

of

persuasion

and

conceptualization.

I

want

to

juxtapose, here, a passage from each of the two major case
studies in Character Analysis. These represent solutions to
the writer's problem; they illustrate what tends to happen
in

reading

shocks

this

and

text -

the

disjunctures,

experience
empty

of

spaces,

a

variety

which

of

allow

themselves to be filled with the reader's feelings and selfconsciousness.

First, is of a masochistic character type.

The patient, whose analysis we will follow in its essential
features, without going into the full details of his
illness, began the treatment with the following canplaints:
he had been wholly incapable of work and socially apathetic
since he was sixteen. In the sexual sphere, there was a
severe masochistic perversion. He had never cared for
intercourse with girls but had masturbated nightly for
hours in the way characteristic of the pregenital libido
structure. He would roll around on his stanach, and
squeeze his penis while fantasizing that a man or woman was
beating him with a whip. In short, he did not masturbate
in the normal way, i.e., exciting the penis by regular
friction, but by kneading it, clamping it between his
thighs, rul:t>ing it between the palms of his hands, etc.
sensed tbgt
W9§. about to ejaculate, he wou1d
bQld ~ gng ~ until the excitation had subsided, in
order, .then, .tQ begin ~. He masturbated in this way
night after night, often during the daytime also, until
finally, completely exhausted, he would yield to an
ejaculation in which the semen did not sp.irt out
rhythnically but merely flowed out. Afterwards, he felt
battered, extremely tired, incapable of doing anything,
fretful, "masochistic", tormented. He had an especially
hard time dragging himself out of bed in the morning. In

mm m

m
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spite of an overwhelming sense of guilt, he was not able to
µit a stop to this "loafing in bed." He later described
the whole thing as "masochistic bog.• The more he rebelled
against it, the less he succeeded in extricating himself
from this •masochistic rnooa•, the more deeply he was
engulfed by it. When he entered analysis, this kind of
sexual experience had been going on for years. The effects
on his personality and on his emotional life had been
devastating.17
What

is

noteworthy

in

this

passage

is

the

candor

and

concreteness with which the perversion is described.

The

straightforward erotic material is broken up only once, by
the brief shift to classical clinical language, a reference
to

"the

managed,
The

pregenital
instead,

first

of

libido

by the

these

structure.•

formal

is

the

The

writing

is

creation of suspensions.
italicized

print

of

the

statement:
When he sensed that he was about to ejacu1ate, be. would
hold back and wait until the excitation beQ Subsided, .in
order, jj:m, .tQ beQin ~.

This is a break in the material face of the text; it is also
a formal reference to the content of the statement, to the
breaking up of the flow of conscious erotic material. As
such,

it

throws

the

reader

into

self-consciousness;

it

creates a gap in the flow of words for contemplation or the
intrusion

of

personal

associations.

A

second

formal

curiosity also serves this function. This is the series of
enquoted

"masochistic•,

words:

•masochistic bog",
third and

fourth

indicated.

This

and

•masochistic mood."

item is the
creates

"loafing

a

in

bed•,

Not until

the

referent of the quotations

similar

space

of

questioning,
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confusion, opening for self-consciousness in the course of
reading. In addition, the erotic content of the narrative
tends to overpower the one attempt Reich makes to establish
a

conventional

control

over

his

material.

This

is

the

remark, "he did not masturbate in the normal way.• In the
context of sexology in the 1930"s, it is itself provocative
and liberating - that masturbation should at all be judged
normal. These offer considerable space or freedom for the
reader to work at her or his own relationship to the very
frank material Reich presents - in a sense, to self-create
the

text

and

open

up

the

psychoanalytic

discourse

as

appears

in

potentiality.
A somewhat

different

formal

strategy

Reich's narrative of the case history of a schizophrenic,
but it signifies a similar moment of cooperation between
author and reader.
What is to follow now will awear utterly incredible.
Therefore, I wish to assure the reader that I had not the
faintest idea of the existence of such mechanisms. But
since the treabnent of this case the facts to be described
have been found in several other cases of schizophrenia.
Clinically, as well as orgone-biophysically, there can no
lcnger be any doubt about the reality of these facts.
Nineteenth session
The patient came to the nineteenth sessicn very calm
arXl co-ordinated, but slightly absent-minded. She spoke
very slowly, as if against some great obstacle1 she said
that she was very depressed. She had been shopping the day
before, for the first time in many mmths1 she had bought
many things, had enjoyed them as never before, had shown
them to her friends, and had slept well. The following
morning, however, she was overcome by great emptiness and
tiredness. '!here was a "nothingness• in her1 and she had
felt the need to sit quietly in sane comer "and not to
move at all.• •Every movement was such a great effort.•
She wanted to be by herself. She gave the impression of an
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oncaning catatonia with imnobility and perseveratiai.
"Everything was very far away •••• I watched If!Yself as
if I were outside of If!YSelf; I felt clearly double; a body
here and a soul there ••• (Saying this, she pointed outward
toward the wall)... .I ~ ~ _tmt .I ~ ~ person ...
but .I am outside mvself ••• perhaps there wbere ~ 'forces'

...·She searched with her eyes anxiously aloog

~

the walls.
is the aurora borealis?
(Very slowly, as if with great effort) I heard about it
once; there are patterns and wavy pathways in the sky •••
(She looked again searchingly along the walls of the room,
as if strongly absent) • • • I hear you, I see you, but
sanehow far away ••• at a very great distance ••• I know very
well that I am trembling now, I feel it ••• but it is not
me, it is SOOtething else ••• (after a loog pause) ••• I would
like to get rid of this body; it is not me; .I ~ .tQ ~
where ~ 'forces' ~· •• "
I was deeply moved in a quite unprofessiooal manner
when I witnessed her experience of the schizophrenic split
and depersonalizatioo in such an unequivocal manner ••••
This was clearly one of the most iqx>rtant sessions
in her treatment and, I must a&l, one of the most
instructive happenings in I1¥ whole medical experience. Let
us pause for a while and try to understand what had
happened. To the disinterested institutional psychiatrist,
who sees such things happen many times every day, it means
"just nothing"~ only another of those "crazy things going
on in the lunatic.• To us, this experience of a living
organism is full of meaning and deep secrets. I shall try
to connect these phenanena with what we know fran
orgone-biophysical functioning of the organism. As far as
I know, neither psychology nor chemistry nor classical
physics could offer any plausible interpretation.18
~

Then, suddenly, she asked:

Again, the clinical evidence is presented concretely.

And

again, the material face of the text, the typography, the
pauses,

elisions

in

the

patient's

musings,

the

italicazations of certain passages, manage the material with
the effect of creating spaces, suspensions for the reader's
own

thoughts.

words

and

Notably,

phrases

interpretative

the

indicate

significance.

numerous
they
But

emphases

are

of

they

on

certain

theoretical
are

or

emphasized
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inconsistently, so their significance is merely suggested.
Reich

withholds

any

specific

explanation

of

them,

encouraging the reader to work out their meaning himself or
herself,

and

leaving

internal

voicing

eccentricity,
dramatic

of

the

reader

the

text,

personality.

references

to

hanging.

They

signifying

Also

himself

are

scientist.

sensible reading of his intention, here,

an

individuality,

notable
as

become

Reich's
The

most

is to bring the

reader into the text, into collusion with his argument. But
the tone of these statements at the same time works against
such

an

intention.

They

"utterly incredible",

are

excesses.

"there can no

The

longer

evidence
be

any

is

doubt

about the reality of these facts•, they are "full of meaning
and
this

deep secrets."
knowledge

is

The

alliance

of author and

too

special.

It

professional community of science:

is

reader

exclusive

of

in
the

"neither psychology nor

chemistry nor classical physics could offer any plausible
interpretations." So the reader is left on the edge of his
own involvement and suspicion,
criticism,

self-reliance,

a

line which leads toward

and self-consciousness.

Finally,

the dramatic meaning of this case history is the surprising
discovery that schizophrenics are in touch with an otherwise
suppressed physiological reality.

The streamings of sexual

energy, of which they are intensely aware, but which they
misname,

are

feeling,

truer

more

important

than

ordinary

than normal discourse.

thinking

and

This meaning is in
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accord with the consequences, whether intentional or not, of
Reich's formal approach - with breaks in the language of the
text and the attention of the reader. These both signify
and allow moments for deep processes to intervene on the
surface of problematic words.
Reich's work in the psychoanalytic movement paralleled
a

second,

equally

important,

career

in

working

class

politics during these years of preparation and writing of
Character Malysis. This was a natural consequence of his
curiosity and

sympathy

for

the

lower

class

patients

he

treated in the Polyclinic. It was precipitated directly by
a notorious incident -

the murder of eighty-nine leftist

demonstrators and the injury of over a thousand more by
Vienna police on July 15, 1927. Reich witnessed the mass
demonstration and the ensuing three hour battle, and joined
the Austrian Communist Party the same evening.
According to Reich, his political experience decidedly
influenced

his

theoretical

and

therapeutic

work

psychoanalysis.
In 1928, I founded the Socialist Society for sex-counseling
and sex-Research with several Viennese physicians. Based
on sex-econanic principles, it established the first sexcounseling centers for workers and business employees in
Vienna •••• '!he society took the positicn that sexual misery

was essentially brought about by social conditions rooted
in the bourgeois social order and that it could not be
renoved entirely but at least could be alleviated by aid to
the individual. In a<i:liticn, information on sexual matters
was to be widely circulated arncng working people. The
knowledge underlying this inforrnaticn would be broadened by
social work and research on individuals. I reserved the
positicn of scientific director for nrtself. Six counseling
centers were opened inmediately, each directed by a

in
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physician. 'Ihree obstetricians placed themselves at our
disposal to assist with problem pregnancies. A lawyer also
participated.
(What was new about our counseling centers [sexhygiene clinics] was that we integrated the problems of the
neuroses, sexual disturbances, and everyday cooflicts. It
was also new to attack the neuroses by prevention rather
than treatnent. This depended basically on the handling of
sexuality in children and young people •••• )19
This clinical work also had political intentions and impact.
Reich

experienced

successes

in

organizing

especially

proletarian youth on the issues of sexual freedom comparable
to his achievements in therapeutic technique1 he inspired
dramatic

new

interest

working

people,

as

and

commitment among

well

as

party

thousands of

intellectuals

and

organizers.
His

approach,

however,

was

ultimately

unpolitical.

The Communist Party leadership in both Austria and Germany
calculated that the issue of sexual freed om would deflect
revolutionary

energies.

And

influential

figures

in

the

psychoanalytic movement feared the potentially destructive
consequences
private

not

only

practices,

but

reactionary
conventional

-

political

to

their

also

climate -

morality.

growing and

from
of

Consequently,

the

such a
Reich

lucrative

increasingly
challenge
was

to

expelled

from the Communist Party in November, 1933, and from the
International Psychiatric Association during its congress in
Lucerne in the summer of 1934.
significant

theoretical

issues

Matters of principle and
were

also

considered

by

Reich's opponents during these controversies. But there was
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sufficient

opportunism,

double

dealing,

and

hysterical

resentment against Reich on the parts of the leaderships of
these

organizations

that

Reich

justifiably

felt

himself

persecuted.2e
His struggle with these institutions during the early
1930's

informed

another

central

concept

of

Character

Analysis, that of the emotional plague. This term describes
the

tendency

of

men

and

women

to

think

and

behave

domineeringly and destructively, even in the name of reason
and morality.
his

own

whereby

It

represents Reich's effort to understand

persecution.
the

most

He

attempted

humanistic,

to

name

that

failure

scientifically-minded

traditions succumbed to inflexibility, pettiness, and fear
in their struggle against fascism.
essential and basic characteristic of ~ emotional
plaque reaction .i§. .tnet. action and the motive of the
action never coincide. k ~ motive is concealed and a
fillBm motive .ll given ~ _tm reason for the action. In the
reaction of the natural and healthy individual, motive,
action, and gQSl form an organic unity. Nothing is
concealed. This unity is imnediately evident. For
example: the healthy individual has no other motive for
his sexual acts than his natural need for love, and no
other goal than its gratification. The ascetic, plagueriden individual, on the other hand, uses ethical codes to
justify his sexual debility... The person afflicted with
the emotional plague is distinguished from the healthy
individual by the fact that he makes bi§. demands of life
not all.y on himself but, aboye fil, m his enviraunent ••••
Individuals afflicted with the emotional plague do not
tolerate views which threaten their armor or unmask their
irrational motives. The healthy person is happy to be
given an insight into his motives. The plague-afflicted
individual is seized by frenzy. When views contrary to his
own disrupt his life and work, the healthy individual puts
up a strong rational fight for the preservation of hi§. way
of life. The plague-afflicted person fights against other
modes of life even when they don't concern him in any way
An
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whatever. He is impelled to fight because he sensea the
very existence of other ways of life as a provocation.~l
Of interest, here, is the special validity Reich's own
work relationships have for this concept. Reich engages in
a

particular

mode

of

generalization,

from

personal

experience to historical significance to scientific concept.
This is a peculiar mix of intimacy and grandeur, everyday
life and instrumental technique.
No one will take it as an insult if he is told that he is
suffering from a cardiac disease or that he is nervous. No

one should take it as an insult if he is told that he is
suffering from an "acute attack of the emotional plague."
we sometimes hear it said among orgonomists: "No sense
wasting your time with me today, I'm pesty." In our
circle, when someone is afflicted with a minor case of the
emotional plague, he deals with it by isolating himself and
waiting until the attack of irrationalism passes. In
acute cases, where rational thinking and friendly advice
are of no avail, orgone therapy is used to remove the
infecticn. It can be seen again and again that such acute
attacks of the emotional plague are always produced by a
disturbance in the person's love life. They disai;:pear on
the elimination of the disturbance. The acute attack of
the plague is such a familiar phenomenon to me and to II\Y
circle of co-workers that we accept it as a matter of
course and deal with it objectively. It is extremely
important for stu:lents of orgone therapy to learn to
perceive acute attacks of the plague in themselves before
such attacks go too far, to know how to keep such attacks
from getting the best of them, to prevent them from
spreading into the social environment and causing damage
there, and, by means of intellectual detachment, to wait
until they pass. In this way, we succeed in keeping
harmful effects in our cooperative work at a minimum.
Sanetimes such an attack cannot be dealt with and the
afflicted person causes a certain amount of harm or even
resigns. we take such misfortunes in the same way one
would take the acute physical ailment or demise of a
beloved colleague.22
Not only Reich's viewpoint, but also his tone and sense seem
wrong,

or

at

least

surprising.

The

very

term

for
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irrationality,

the emotional plague,

is peculiar not only

for the way in which it suggests emotions to be concrete
entities,

infections, mechanistic phenomena,

its ominous power.

but also for

The language is at once catastrophic,

clinical, and intimate. The sense of the text moves between
suggestions of terror and home remedy. The moments Reich is
describing

with

professional

such

foreboding

jealousies,

anger,

are

personal

selfishness,

and

competitive

resentments, the stuff that careers, office politics, daily
life,

and regrets are made of.

disjuncture

in

the

text.

Again,

They

these

strike

represent a

the

reader

as

improprieties, puzzlements within a scientific discourse as

the

interpenetration

of

text

and

life,

science

and

intimate charm, reason and special pleading.
Reich's description is also utopian,

unrealistic,

a

misleading account of his relationships with his workers,
which

were

death,
outcast

actually

Reich

much

attempted

predicament

cloudier.

to

as

compensate
a

organizations of his own.

From 1935
for

scientist

until

his

by

his

homeless,

constructing

The last of these,

the Orgone

Institute, which Reich founded after emigrating to New York
in 1941 and ultimately settling at Rangeley, Maine, became
consumed

repeatedly

with

its

director's

sexual

unfaithfulness and jealousy. He had affairs with patients,
co-workers,

and co-workers'

wives1

and

feelings with destructive consequences.

he

projected

bad
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Always, in times of stress, one of Reich's very hmnan
failings came to the foreground, and that was his violent
jealousy. He would always emphatically deny that he was
jealous, but there is no getting away from the fact that he
would accuse his wife of infidelity with any man who came
to his mim as a possible rival, whether colleague, friend,
local shopkeeper, or casual acquaintance. It was one of
those strange contradictions in Reich's make-up, and
another one that must have been founded on some basic,
unresolved feelings of insecurity, because there were no
reasons in fact for these jealousies. However, they seemed
to provide him with what he must have felt was a rational
outlet for his anger against the world.23
He also dominated his staff at the Institute, unable to work
with anyone except the most obedient and unquestioning.
I think, theoretically, he expected people to know what
they were doing, to follow him in his pursuits because they
knew he was right or that his theories were correct or
because they felt about these things the same way he did.
But in practice he overlooked the fact that few of those
around him were equipped, emotionally or otherwise, to
follow him or to understand his theories. They would
follow, if they did, out of admiration, out of love, out of
blind loyalty or sometimes, out of fear of being kicked out
of his orbit. The power of his personality was enormous,
and was difficult to understand. It was this inflexible
attitooe of his, more than anything else, that again and
again, lost him friends and co-workers.24
The direction of Reich's career after his expulsions
from the communist and psychoanalytic movements was toward
a mechanical explanation of this sort of irrational feeling.
His

theoretical

work

became

increasingly

projective,

an

identification of historical with personal conflicts, and
their universalization into a wonderfully imaginative and
suggestive,

but eccentric,

physics

and

cosmology.

In an

analogy to the autonomic undulations of the body musculature
during

orgasm,

Reich

postulated

a

quantifiable

flow

of

electrical energy throughout the human body and all living
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organisms. This also is a wave-like motion, an alternation
between the interior and exterior 1 imi ts of the body.

In

1934, he attempted to document this by measuring changes in
the skin potential of his
found

correspondences

patients'

among

a

erogenous areas.

tendency

of

the

He

deep

functioning of the body toward the periphery, increased skin
charge, and erotic and pleasurable feelings on one hand, and
movement away from the periphery, decreased skin charge, and
subjective feelings of unpleasure or anxiety on the other.
In

1935,

Wilhelm

Hoffmann,

a

German

physiologist

collaborating with Reich, attempted to test these findings
and Reich's general theory by measuring the skin potential
of

schizophrenic

should

have

patients.

been

Their

manifested

in

emotional
lower

skin

withdrawal
potential

measurements, especially in the conventional sex-sensitive
areas of their bodies. But Hoffmann was unable to reproduce
any difference at all,

and Reich angrily repudiated his

colleague's experiments.
In new observations with plant· tissue in solution,
Reich

argued

that

the

erotic-like

pulsations

of

disintegrating cells were evidence of a fundamental life
form,

which

he

named

the

bion.

Critics

attempting

to

replicate his studies dismissed his claims, insisting he had
witnessed Brownian movement, the tendency of small particles
to oscillate as a result of their collision with neighboring
molecules.

Reich's resentment and isolation grew.
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In 1941, he met with Albert Einstein and attempted to
explain

the

bion,

as

well

as

further

discoveries:

the

release of a bluish light and light corpuscles concomitant
to

the

creation

of

bions

by

means

of

disintegrating beach sand in solution;

also,

heating

and

the seeming

accumulation of heat within specially constructed boxes of
celotex,

steel

and

glass

wool,

and

sheet

iron.

Reich

described these phenomena as the release and absorption of a
basic life energy associated with the bion, which he named
orgone energy. He reported still more experiments, in which
cancer-afflicted rats placed inside the orgone accumulator
boxes experienced significantly increased life spans.
Einstein was initially excited by Reich's visit.
He also promised to support Reich's discovery if the
findings were verified. Before leaving, Reich suggested
that Einstein could now understand the rumor that he was
insane. Einstein replied that he certainly could ••••
Subsequently, he wrote Reich that he had limited his
efforts to the terrperature difference because of his
inability to exclude subjective impressions regarding the
light manifestations of orgone energy. Initially, he found
the accumulator temperature regularly higher.... However,
an assistant had offered the explanation that this
difference was due to convection currents between the air
over the table and the air of the room as a whole ••••
To Einstein's credit, he thought seriously for awhile
and he experimented. But once satisfied with his own
explanation, he believed the matter "completely solved",
and showed no wish to pursue Reich's further
experiments.25
In

desperation,

support
about

for

having

his
his

Reich

pressed

Einstein

work.

The

physicist

name

used

for

to

give

"responded

advertising

public
angrily

purposes. 11 26

Reich reacted with the accusation "that Einstein's sudden
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indifference

was

part

of

a

general

communist-inspired

conspiracy against Reich's work.27
Also during 1941, Reich began experimenting with sick
human beings in the accumulator boxes.

Patients reported

experiencing feelings of increased well-being, as well as
decreased pain. A number of Reich's cancer patients claimed
remission

and

significant

shrinking

of

tumors

to

allow

successful surgery.
During
further

the

later

elaborated

the

1940's

and

theory

of

into
orgone

the

1950's,

energy

as

he
an

antidote to an imminent planetary disaster, manifested in
such phenomena as nuclear radiation, the emotional plague,
weather disturbances, and flying saucer sightings. His son
Peter reveals a sense of Reich's work and thinking in these
years, which maintains, still, a disturbing tension among
child's play, paranoid fantasy, and scientific intuition.
I felt around in the sand near the base of the tree until I
found the buried metal plate. I dug the sand away from the
plate and lifted it up. Beneath it was a small hole in the
ground. I reached into the hole carefully, because there
might be scorpions, and took out a small bundle wrapped in
black banana skins. I laid the bundle on the metal plate
and slcwly unwrapped the bright green glow-in-the-dark
yoyo. It was a beautiful bright yoyo and I was sorry I
couldn't play with it. I slipped the loop over ~ finger
to do a few whirls with it but then I remercbered that Daddy
said it was bad for me. I put it back onto the metal plate
and went into the kitchen for water. I poured the water
into the hole to loosen up the dirt and then I started
digging.
oacHy said I had to bury the glow-in-the-dark yoyo
because the glow stuff was deadly just like fluorescent
light. Glow-in-the-dark light was bad energy and it didn't
mix with Orgone Energy, which was good energy. Daddy was
trying to kill the bad energy in the atmosphere. Bad
energy came from flying saucers and boni:>s. The cloudbuster
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cleaned the atmosphere of the deadly orgone - we called it
DOR - and fought the flying saucers. Only we called the
flying saucers EAs. It was initials. The ~ stood for
something and the A stood for something. Daddy told me
what it was but I forgot. We had names for a lot of stuff.
The EA's energy was like glow-in-the-dark enery and it made
us sick.
We were all sensitive to strange energy things,
especially Ir!Y sister Eva. Fluorescent light was really
bad, and Eva could never understand hCM people could
survive in office buildings with dead light energy. The
same with glCM-in-the-dark watches or television. It got
so Eva could tell if someone was wearing a glCM-in-the-dark
watch just by feeling the energy around him. She could
feel tv that way too and it made her sick. She was the one
who spotted fC!Y green glCM-in-the-dark yoyo. One day when I
came near her she felt funny and got a little green
herself. She asked me what I was wearing and where I had
been. Then I took out the glow-in-the-dark yoyo and
started yoyoing and she almost fainted. That was when
Daddy said I had to bury it.28
In
designed

order

to

both

invasions

to

from

experiments,

support
control

outer

his

a

cloudbuster

machine

the weather and defend against

space

and

other

orgone

energy

Reich began marketing the accumulator boxes;

this had disastrous consequences. In 1946 and 1947, he came
under

attack

Republic:
Fascism,
because

in

two

very

damaging

articles

one, a review of Reich's The

~

in

The

New

Psychology of

"accused Reich of 'utter contempt for the masses
he

stressed

their

mysticism

and

incapacity

for

freedom'"; the second, •The Strange Case of Wilhelm Reich•,
charged that "'The man who blames both neuroses and cancer
on unsatisfactory sexual activities has been repudiated by
only one scientific journal.'"29
end of 1948 it became obvious that a concerted
effort was being made by the American Psychiatric
Association against the spreading of psychiatric orgone
therapy. Several psychiatrists who had been trained by

By the
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Reich and had begun to practice p:;ychiatric orgone therapy
were dismissed from the staffs of hospitals where they
worked after they refused to give up a theraJ:¥ which they
thought beneficial to their patients. others were denied
promotions in professional associations. still others, in
private practice, were approached by the A.P.A. and advised
to sever their connection with Reich. All these men,
graduates of rredical schools of high standing and respected
members of professional organizations, had come to find in
orgone theraJ:¥ a better way of helping their patients - and
on that basis preferred to sever their connection with the
established medical associations rather than with Reich.
Reports came to the Orgone Institute that in lectures and
courses given by merrbers of the American Psychiatric
Association and the New York Psychiatric Association
derogatory remarks about Reich and orgone theraJ:¥ crept in
again and again; and rumors made the rounds that Reich was
in a mental hospital.30
In February, 1954, the Food and Drug Administration brought
an

injunction against marketing the orgone accumulators,

charging that they were being claimed fraudulently to cure
cancer.

Reich promptly defied the ban, and was tried and

convicted for contempt in 1956. Despite improprieties and
contradictions in the government's case,
poor

health,

Reich argued

and his obvious

in his defense only that

the

government had no jurisdiction over basic issues of science,
and that he was the victim of a Red Fascist conspiracy in
particular, and the emotional plague in general. With no
defense made to the specific charge of criminal contempt,
Judge George Sweeney
1956,

to two years

reluctantly
in prison.

sentenced

In August,

Reich

May

3,

federal agents

destroyed the orgone boxes in Reich's possession, and burned
his books and papers. Reich died in his sleep November 3,
1957 in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERATION AND FIELD OF DISCOURSE
Thus

far,

I

have

attempted

to

understand

certain

analogous contradictions in Reich's life and the text of
Character Analysis - failures of memory, erotic moments, an
eccentric science - as manifested formally and signifying
liberation.

I

want

to

proceed

to

a

comparable

problem.

This is the relationship of the book to its social context,
to the special sense of the world experienced by Reich and
his

generation.

This

a

correspondence

between

the

authoritarian tendencies of German and Austrian society and
culture

during

the

imperial

central concept of Reich's The

and

interwar

to

objectify

reason

and

a

the genital character type.

interpenetration of milieu and

attempt

period,

in

text

nature.

appears
And

as

the

again,

the

writing itself signifies a basic motive to overcome habits
of domination and affirm freedom and

tolerance.

This

is

evident formally in Reich's use of identity statements. My
discussion

proceeds

from

a

description

of

some

common

psychological and social experiences shared by Reich and
other Central Europeans of his era, to some common cultural
values, and to some common characteristics of anti-fascist
psychoanalytic writing.
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Peter Loewenberg's concept of

the youth

cohort

is

useful in delineating some attributes of Reich's generation
-

of the social,

intellectual,

and psychological climate

within which Character Analysis was written. He defines a
cohort as
The aggregate of individuals within a population who have

shared a significant conrnon experience of a personal or
historical event at the same time.I
Each

individual

carries

the

effects

of this

significant

experience for his or her entire life. Loewenberg bases his
analysis of twentieth century German political attitudes on
the childhood insecurities suffered by those youth who were
aged eighteen to thirty in 1933, who were born and raised
during the First World war, and who represented nearly half
the

membership

of

the

Nazi

Party,

the

party's

"first

breakthrough into the masses."2
Corrmon experiences in childhood,
in psychosexual
developnent, and in political socialization • • • led to
similar fixations and distortions of adult character. The
specific factors that conditioned this generation include
the prolonged absence of the parents, the return of the
father in defeat, extreme hunger and privation, and a
national defeat in war, which meant the loss of the
prevailing political authority and left no viable
replacement with which to identify.3
The consequences

of these

pressures

"toward violent,

aggressive,

included

'acting out'

a

tendency

behavior",

and

toward "the devices of splitting and projection - the good
and

the

bad

upon

whom

one

can

gratify

aggressive

feelings.•4
The i;sychological symptoms of regression to phases of ego

functioning "fixed" by the trawnata of a childhood in war
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included responding to internal personal stress with
externalized violence, projecting all negative antinational or anti-social qualities onto foreign and ethnic
individuals and groups, and meeting frustrations that would
otherwise be tolerated with patience and rationally
ai;:proa.ched for solutions with a necessity for inmediate
gratification. The political expression of weakened egos
and superegos that fostered regression was man ifest not
only in turning to violence but most especially in the
longing for a glorified and idealized but distant father
who is all-knowing and all-p<:Merful, who preaches military
virtues and permits his sons and daughters to identify with
him by wearing a uniform and joining conbat in a national
cause.5
Reich and many of his patients, of course, were born into
the generation previous to this. But his own cohort shared
similar economic stresses, especially those caused by the
mass movement of people from Eastern and Southern Europe
into the ind us trial cities of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Reich was exposed to the psychological pressures of the war
as a combat officer and to the after-effects of the German
Revolution of 1918 as a Communist Party organizer. And, as
we have seen, he suffered severely the trauma of parental
So

loss.

Loewenberg's

concept

of

generation

helps

illuminate not only the climate of thought and experience,
but also the individual sensibility, which inform the text.
The concept of national character is similarly useful.
In an anthropological study of Germans who survived World
war Two, David Rodnick delineates a number of significant
traits,

indicating

a

basic

pattern

of

submissiveness,

obedience, insecurity, and yearning for community.
[A] dependence upon others for affection is present
throughout German society and may well arise from the
extremely warm and submissive relation of parents in German
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family life. The experiences of most Germans after the
adolescent years tend to negate this pattern, but the
desire for affection remains. The insecure world of the
adult, where personal goals are difficult to realize, where
hopes can be easily shattered, where social status can be
tenuous, and hostility is met far more often than
friendliness, makes the German feel that he must not show
any softness but be hard toward his fellow man. In a world
where, at a cost to his own ego, he must constantly defer
to individuals above him in social status, he rarely feels
personally secure. He learns to conform to the prevalent
patterns because he will be punished if he does not, but
underneath there is a desire to feel that he has not fear
but liking for those above him, and that they in turn like
him.6
German

children

were

shown

constant

affection

parents from infancy; until the age of three
by their

mothers

for

much of

their

waking

~hey

by

were held

hours.

physical needs were completely ministered to.

both

Their

warmth and

security extended to these children's entire experience.
Even strangers are brought into the world of intimacy
surrounding the child as "uncles" and "aunts", and the
child is encouraged to look upon everyone who enters the
family circle as being friendly toward him.7
In addition, discipline was stressed.

"Among all classes,

toilet training begins when the infant is about five months
old."8 German children learn politeness, cooperativeness, a
regard

for

others,

and

egalitarianism within

the family

environment. The contradictions to adult experience status

preoccupations,

economic

struggle,

and

of

alienated

affections - became mediated by strong class consciousness
and intense friendships formed in adolescence.
The German adolescent feels a strong bond between himself
and others of his age. He would like to see a society

developed exclusively for adolescents to protect them
against the difficulties of living in a world controlled by
their elders who make no provision for the youth to replace
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them through assistance,
effacement. 9

guidance,

and gradual

self-

And it was compensated in part by early sexual experience.

Middle class boys were generally sexually active by the age
of

fourteen,

usually

with

prostitutes

or

servants.

Proletarian youths tended to remain innocent longer, unable
to

obtain

prostitutes

until

they

became

wage-earners,

usually at age seventeen. Early engagements and pre-marital
sex were

common;

girls were

expected

to provide

sexual

favors in exchange for the companionship of boys. Orgasm
and sexual satisfaction among middle class women were rare.
Although marriages were generally life-long
about

half

mistresses

of

bourgeois

or

frequent

German

men

arrangements,

continued

prostitutes.

This

to

have

was

not

economically possible for working men, who tended to be less
impotent

and

more

affectionate

patterns

of

unfulfilling

with

sexual

their

wives.

arrangements

These

and

of

submission to authority in family life recall Reich's own
childhood experiences and point to his condemnation of the
wide-ranging consequences of patriarchy and repression.
The

experiences

of

adolescents

cannot

be

overemphasized as factors in the creation of German culture
and

society

during

Reich's

period

which

was

marked

politically by the development of mass organizations outside
of

traditional

parties,

and

generally

by

strong

authoritarian, communal, and erotic features. This is most
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notably evident

in the

impact of

the youth movement

in

Germany and Austria during the decades from 1890 and 1930.
Reich

himself

years

in

joined an

Vienna.

And

Alpine

certain

club

during

features

of

his

student

the

Volkish

movement are reflected in his work. A significant one is
the emphasis placed on liberating activity. Walter Laqueur,
in his study of Young Germany, recalls
"Nobody but the Gennan knows in which direction he is
moving." When I first read those words [of Martin Voelkel,
a youth leader], If!Y memory was taken back to something that
had ha:f.Pened to me in 1934. I was visiting one of the
brand new Gennan labour camps at Rendsburg in SchleswigHolstein, in an attempt to understand the Hitler Youth.
That evening, in the youth hostel, we got into a fierce
argument and I accused the Nazis of leading Europe to
destruction. At this point, If!Y oi;:ponent, a handsome,
uniformed blond, drew himself up and shouted, "At least
Gernany is leading and you are dragging along behind."10
Besides

its

nationalism,

characteristic

of Volkish

certainly
thinking

the

is

its

most

evident

faith

in

the

transformative power of action - in and of itself - over the
future.

It

is

a

utopian

mode

of

thought,

based

on

a

yearning to negate the present and open up time for the
emergence

of

conviction,

potentiality

the

youth

and

movement

authenticity.
voiced

an

In

this

"unpolitical

protest against bourgeois civilization's lack of vitality,
warmth, emotion, and ideals. nll Equally characteristic was
its

emphasis

on

leadership.

This

was

understood

as

a

natural, sexual quality, with physical beauty and grace its
emblems. An important experience in many of these groups
was ecstatic surrender - often to music and dance, or to the
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erotic appeal of the group leader. Protests against sexual
repression were often found in their programs.
attitudes

These
historical

expression

their

found
in

those

most

significant

undercurrents

society which apotheosized war,

which valued

of

Weimar

leadership,

action, and erotically charged physical courage and grace as
absolutes. The German army toward the end of World War One
recruited and promoted from the ranks an enormous number of
officers of a special type, young, unmarried, often former
athletes, and without regard to class background. Trained
to function in a horrifying war,

commissioned,

and given

status counter to traditional social constraints, these men
became

after

the

armistice

the

leaders

of

"fighters who could not be debrutalized. nl2

a
An

mass

of

estimated

200,000 to 400,000 veterans, ruthless, arrogant, and without
attachments, joined the Free Corps, the private armies used
against the Spartacus Uprising and the chronically unstable
Weimar

Rupblic.

In

the

words

of

the

writer

Ernst

von

Salomon:
The war could not release them from its grip ••• The most
active part of the Front marched simply because it had
learned to march. It marched through the cities enveloped
in a cloud of sullen rage - a cloud of vaulting,
purix>seless fury - knowing that now it had to fight, to
fight at any cost ••• This then was the one problem of the
Free Corp:; fighter: to give his utmost so that the real
meaning of ;11 war could be made manifest to the very limit
of his power. 3

As a social, psychological, and cultural force, the German
war veterans resemble the Volkish youth in their critical
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attitude toward bourgeois liberalism and they resemble Reich
in their valuing of an activity beyond words and thought as
a form of liberation.

Again, in von Salomon's words:

we were cut off from the world of burqerlich norms ••• The
bonds were broken and we were free. The blood surging
through our veins was full of a wild demand for revenge and
adventure and danger... We were a band of fighters drunk
with all the passions of the world; full of lust, exultant
in action. What we wanted, we did not know. And what we
knew, we did not want! War and adventure, excitement and
destruction. An indefinable, surging force welled up from
every part of our being and flayed us onward.14
This pure resentment, at base obj ectless, exemplifies the
wellspring of psychological projection that pervaded Reich's
ego.

Social

pressures,

individual

insensitivities,

and

emerging erotic desires all combined to form a typical mode
of

thinking.

It

characteristically

confused

rebellious

yearnings with habits of sadistic domination. This seems to
me

similar

to

what

we

have

seen

as

a

significant

contradiction in Reich's own life and work.
These aspects of Central European society and culture
in general -

insecurity, tendencies toward domination and

projection, the eroticization of political issues - recall
more than contradictions and characteristics of Character
Analysis.

A struggle

toward consciousness

of these

issues is typical of a special realm of discourse psychoanalytic

critique

of

fascism.

Reich's

same
the

historical

reputation to a large extent derives from his own pioneering
work - and Character Analysis is illuminated by its place in this tradition. I want to proceed to describe a number
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of these important writings in the hope they might point up
the

relative

significance

historical

of

Reich's

contradictory tendencies toward liberation and domination.
Perhaps the most widely known work in this tradition
is Erich Fromm's

Escape ..f.LQm Freedom.

Fromm attempts to

define a historically important feature, a typology of the
character structure of the masses.
respects

similar

to

Reich's.

It

This is only in some
is

independent

of

any

theory of material instincts. The most significant neurotic
type

for

both

writers

is

the

sadomasochist.

But

Fromm

emphasizes ego conflict rather than sexuality.
The difference between the perversion and masochistic
character traits lies essentially in the following: In the
perversion the trend to get rid of one's self is expressed
through the medium of the body and linked up with sexual
feelings. While in moral masochism, the masochistic trends
get hold of the whole person and tend to destroy all the
aims which the ego consciously tries to achieve; in the
perversim the masochistic strivings are more or less
restricted to the physical realm; moreover by their
amalgamation with sex they participate in the release of
tension occurring in the sexual sphere and thus find some
direct release.
The annihilation of the individual self and the
attempt to overcane thereby the unbearable feeling of
powerlessness are only one side of the masochistic
strivings. The other side is the attempt to become part of
a bigger and more powerful whole outside of oneself, to
submerge and participate in it. This power can be a
person, an institution, God, the nation, conscience, or a
psychic cornµilsion. By becoodng part of a power which is
felt as unshakably strong, eternal, and glamorous, one
participates in its strength and glory. One surrenders
one's own self and renounces all strength and pride
cormected with it, one loses one's integrity as an
individual and surrenders freedan; but one gains a new
security and a new pride in the participation in the power
in which one sul:merges.15

Fromm also opposes the neurotic to an ethically normative,
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rational, free personality type similar to Reich's genital
character.
With regard to single ccncepts we have shown that to the
sado-masochistic character, for example, love means
syrrbiotic dependence, not mutual affirmation and union on
the basis of equality; sacrifice means the utmost
subordination of the individual self to something higher,
not assertion of one's mental and moral self; difference
means difference in power, not the realization of
individuality on the basis of equality; justice means
everybody should get what he deserves, not that the
individual has an unconditional claim to the realization of
inherent and inalienable rights; courage is the readiness
to submit and endure suffering, not the utmost assertion of
individuality against power.16
however,

Fromm,

makes a very broad historical and social

analysis on the basis of an unmediated analogy to clinical
findings.
The physiologically conditioned needs are not the only

imperative part of man's nature. There is another part
just as co~lling, one which is not rooted in bodily
processes, but in the very essence of the human mode and
practise of life: the need to be related to the world
outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness.17
There is a

certain advantage to this.

Evidence of social

unreason and domination need not be tied to actual emotional
disorders nor their physiological aetiologies. Consequently
fascist
group or
certain

tendencies can be predicated or explained of any
individual
problem.

impressionistically.

Critique

loses

the

There

force

of

is also a
a

natural

necessity, and becomes a transparent projection of purely
personal concerns.

This is true of Fromm's history-making

in Escape from Freedom, his identification of fascism with
the Protestant Reformation as a class response to crisis,

80

insecurity, and change.
Thereby the new religious doctrines not only gave
expression to what the average rnenber of the middle class
felt, but, by rationalizing and systematizing this
attitlde, they also increased and strengthened it.
However, they did more than that; they also showed the
individual a way to cope with his anxiety. They taught him
that by fully accepting his pcMerlessness and the evilness
of his nature, by considering his whole life an atonement
for his sins, by the utrrost self-humiliation, and also by
unceasing effort, he could be loved by God and could at
least hope to belong to those whan God had decided to save.
Protestantism was the answer to the human needs of the
frightened, uprooted, and isolated individual who had to
orient and to relate himself to a new world. 'I.be new
character structure, resulting from economic and social
changes and intensified by religious doctrines, became in
its turn an important factor in shaping the further social
and economic developnent.18
However suggestive this might be as an historical insight,
it

undetermined

is

by

empirical

any

constraints.

Protestantism doubtlessly was also the very human response
of the strong, self-assured, secure, flexible, and loving to
their

historical

sadomasochistic
institutions

situation

of

characters

typified

by

~enital

as

well

informed

and
freedom

as

well

as

as

social
economic

discipline. So at times Escape from Freedom seems itself an
exercise in intolerance - and certainly subject to the same
strains and contradictions as Reich's work.
G.
explains

M.

Gilbert,

fascism

as

in
an

~

Psychology of Dictatorship,

interaction

of

the

individual

psychosexual characteristics of its leadership with social
stresses

and

cultural norms.

clinical

evidence

prison

Unlike Fromm,
interviews

and

he

relies on

psychological

81

tests of Goering,

Hess, Frank, Ribbentrop,

and Hoess.

Of

course, this was not an ideal therapeutic situation; Gilbert
did not face his subjects with the sympathy of the physician
seeking an understanding that comes with cure, but as an
interlocutor assuming criminal guilt. And his analysis of
Hitler had to be secondhand. But he is careful with the
complex

mediations

between

individual

personality

and

historical events.
This confusion of values and i;:uq:x>ses at the very outset of
the National Socialist movement was largely determined by
the multiplicity of Hitler's aggressive needs and
ant:>ivalent group identifications. It also accounted for
the extreme variety of personalities and motives among the
followers, rendering any categorical judrts on the
character of the Nazis extremely unreliable. 9
Gilbert understands psychopathic leadership as a type of
response

to

notes

characterological

a

real

social

contradictions.
symptom

reminiscent of Reich's discussion.

of

For example,
Hitler

which

he
is

His relationships with

women were supposedly abnormal. Al though there is no good
evidence to believe that he committed sexual perversions, he
showed an "inhibited and strained... inordinate pol! teness
and show of gallantry."
[He] would kiss the hand of an ordinary unmarried girl,
ina:rpropriately imitating the gesture reserved for Junkers'
and ministers' wives.20
This quirk was the trivial acting out of a profound class
contradiction, a subtle aggression, and an impropriety that
reflected a yearning for class reconciliation in the midst
of extreme differences of status. A similar dynamic was at
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work in Rudolf Hess.
The palpable psychopathology in Hess I case aweared to be
directly related to [a] conflict of social values. Though
it undoubtedly had its roots in his early emotional
developnent, the breakdown into outright hysterical and
paranoid symptoms was precipitated by social conflict: the
incompatibility of humanitarian ideals and aggressive
ethnocentricity.21

Perhaps Gilbert's most striking evidence comes from Rudolf
Hoess,

commander

of

the

extermination

Hoess

camps.

exhibited an unusual poverty of affect; sex played almost no
part in his life, he showed no passion toward his wife, and
never

masturbated

nor

felt

the

desire

to.

Hoess'

distraction matched his historical role.
The five years of solitary confinement in Dachau virtually

canpleted the withdrawal process. By the time he became
"desensitized" to the task of extermination, he was a
walking inhuman rd::>ot, utterly devoid of human empathy, yet
functioning intellectually on a high level of mechanical
efficiency.22
Gilbert's point is that social and cultural contradictions
fed a monstrously criminal political activity, because of
their

extreme

demands

on

normal

psychological

adaption

functions. It is a point that surprisingly seems to extend
sympathy and

understanding

even to fascists as bound in

ahead of social, psychological, and historical fact.
Erik

H.

Erikson,

in

"Wholeness

and

Totality

-

a

Psychiatric Contribution" to Carl J. Friedrich's symposium
on totalitarianism, approaches the problem of fascism with
still stronger therapeutic empathy.
I begin with the assumption that totalitarianism is based
on universal human potentialities and is thus related to
all aspects of human nature, wholesome and pathological,
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adult
and
infantile,
individual
and
societal.
Totalitarianism has often been a near reality: it has
merely waited for "its" historical rooment.... Only such
historical perspective can give the proper measure of the
different degrees and kinds of ideological involvement on
the part of the many types that make up a totalitarian
state: fanatic apostles and the shrewd revolutionaries;
lonely
leaders
and
oligarchic
cliques;
obedient
bureaucrats and efficient managers, soldiers, and
engineers; sincere believers and sadistic exploiters;
willing followers, apathetic toilers, and paralyzed
OH;>Onents; unnerved victims and bewildered would-be
and could-be victims.23
Fascism as a historical moment is possible because it draws
on

typical

experiences

in

individual

development.

The

normal healthy alternation between various given poles of
living and feeling -

Erikson mentions an

infant's happy

pattern of waking and sleeping as an example - gives way at
critical times in any human life to what Erikson calls total
realignments.
Violent loves and hates and sudden conversions and
aversions share with the child's fetishism and fears such
factors as the exclusive focusing of a set of (friendly or
unfriendly) affects on one person or idea; the
primitivization of all affects thus focused; and a utopian
(or cataclysmic) expectation of a total gain or a total
loss to come from this focus •••
While such realigrunents may seem to appear suddenly,
they develop slowly. Only unconmonly aware and brave
people know about themselves what psychoanalysis reveals in
others, and particularly patients - namely, how strong and
systematic are man• s proclivities gng potentialities .fQr.
total realigmneots, often barely hidden behind one-sided
predilections and convictions, and how much energy is
enployed in inner defenses against a threatening total
reorientation in which black may turn into white and vice
versa •••• At any rate, we have learned to understand such
realignments as readjustments on a more primitive level,
made necessary by increased anxieties, especially of
infantile origin, and called forth by acute life crises.24
Perhaps the most common of these totalistic adjustments is
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the experience of romantic love, the selection of a single
object as the focus of all affect and self-identification.
The

origin

of

these

experiences

is

the

infant's

total

dependence on its mother and the total rage it can suffer in
moments of powerless, frustrated impoverishment. Periods of
radical

social

change

can

throw an

entire

society,

and

especially its youth, back to a condition within which this
rage predominates.
Where historical and technological develoµnents severely
encroach upon deeply rooted or strongly emerging identites
(i.e., agrarian, feudal, patrician) on a large scale, youth
feels endangered, individually and collectively, whereupon
it becomes ready to support doctrines offering a total
imnersion in a synthetic identity (extreme nationalism,
racism, or class consciousness) and a collective
condemnation of a totally stereotyped enemy of the new
identity. '!be fear of loss of identity which fosters such
indoctrination contributes significantly to that mixture of
righteousness and criminality which, under totalitarian
conditions, becomes available for organized terror and for
the establishnent of major industries of extermination.
Since conditions undermining a sense of identity also
fixate older individuals on adolescent alternatives, a
great nurrber of adults fall in line or are paralyzed in
their resistance.25
Erikson opposes the experience of totality with what he
names

wholeness;

emphasizing

this

is

flexibility

another

and

ego

tolerance,

development
and

norm,

similar

to

Reich's genital character.
There seems to be something like a movement from Fromm
to Gilbert and Erikson of increasing sympathy for the human
experience

that

makes

the

mass

psychology

of

fascism

possible. This is still clearer in Georges Bataille's "The
Psychological

Structure of Fascism." Bataille proposes a
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typology of social existence defined by the categories of
homogeneous

and

heterogeneous.

Homogeneous

society

is

useful, productive, rational; it is one of concrete cash and
legal

relationships,

interchangeable.

•In

continuities,
the

smooth,

contemporary

period,

and
social

homogeneity is linked to the bourgeois class by essential
ties. •26 The heterogeneous is, on the other hand, related
to

the

unconscious

include disruptions,

and

the

shocks,

masses.

Its

"violence,

characteristics

excess,

delirium,

madness", despair, and revulsion.27
The nauseating forms of dejection provoke a feeling of

disgust so unbearable that it is improper to express or
even to make allusion to it. By all indications, in the
psychological order of disfiguration, the material poverty
of man has excessive consequences.28
It is a manifestation of affect.
It presents itself as a charge, as a value, passing from
one object to another in a more or less abstract fashion,
almost as if the change were taking place not in t~ world
of objects but only in the judgments of the subject. 9
It is the realm of the sacred, the erotic, of poverty, and
filth.

The

kingship,

two
which

categories
represents

are

mediated

both

the

historically

rational,

in

regular

activities of the state, and the irrational attributes of
domination, absolute freedom, and war-making. Fascism is a
peculiar

modern

form

of

kingship,

in

which

the

leader

partakes of "assuming in complete freedom the imperative
character of action", as well as the sacred qualities of
nature and the nation. 30 This is the basis of its appeal,
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its affective connection to the masses.
domination

remains

unstable,

ironically,

However,
because

fascist
of

its

homogeneous elements; its political authority continues to
depend

on

administrative,

juridical,

and

economic

functions. Bataille characterizes fascism as an incomplete
exploitation of heterogeneous aspirations.
Thus the upper part of the heterogeneous region is both
inmobilized and inmobilizing, and only the lower part
formed by the impoverished and oppressed classes is capable
of entering into movement. But, for the latter, passive
and oppressed by definitioo, the fact of entering into
movement represents a profound alteration of their nature:
in order to take part in a struggle against the sovereign
agency and the legal oomogeneity oppressing them, the lower
classes must pass from a passive and diffuse state to a
form of conscious activity; in Marxist terms, these classes
must become aware of themselves as a revolutionary
proletariat. This proletariat cannot actually be limited
to itself: it is in fact only a point of ccncentration for
every dissociated social element that has been banished to
heterogeneity. It is even possible to say that such a
point of concentration exists in a sense prior to the
formation of what must be called the "conscious
proletariat n:
the
general
descriptioo
of
the
heterogeneous region actually implies that it be posited as
a ccnstitutive element of the structure of a whole that
includes not only imperative forms and impoverished forms
but also Subversive forms.31
In other words, the intuitions, the drives, the affects that
erupt in fascism are not so much pathologies as subversive,
liberating powers.
organized understanding of the movements in society, of
attraction and reµilsion, starkly presents itself as a
weapon - at this moment when a vast coovulsioo opposes, not
so much fascism to conmunism, but radical imperative forms
to the deep subversioo which continues to pursue the
emancipation of htnnan lives.32
An

The work

of Max Horkheimer

in effect extends this

sympathy by means of a thoroughgoing radical critique of all
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current social relations as essentially fascist - as moments
of

domination.

These

include

the

concepts

of

reason,

character development and youth, sexuality and the family,
and

the

example,

touchstone

absolute

fascist

in Eclipse .Q.f Reason,

concept of
purely

of

rationality

instrumental,
values,

he argues

racism.
that

in western philosophy

divorced

and

domination,

harnessed

from
to

moral

the very

has

become

decisions

economic

For

and

production,

class, authority, and the destruction of nature.
Having given up autonaJ¥, reasoo has becane an instrument.
In the formalistic aspect of subjective reason, stressed by
positivism, its unrelatedness to objective content is
emphasized; in its instnnnental aspect, stressed by
pragmatism, its surrender to heteronomous contents is
emphasized. Reason has becane canpletely harnessed to the
social process. Its operational value, its role in the
domination of men and nature, has been made the sole
criterion.... NEY use transcending auxiliary, technical
sUIIIIlarization of factual data has been eliminated as a last
trace of superstition. Concepts have becane "streamlined",
rationalized, labor-saving devices. It is as if thinking
itself had been reduced to the level of industrial
processes, subjected to a close schedule - in short, made
part and parcel of production.33
This subjugation of reason signals for Horkheimer something
more than a problem in the history of

~pistemology;

rather,

it adduces a historical system of class relationships which
function
reveals

uniformly
how

reason

as
is

a

totality.
compromised

Its
as

class
a

mere

character
tool

domination.
Insight, for example, may be an important factor in the
develqment and continuance of society; it may even be the
inmediate ground of socialization, as many theories of
Enlightenment times or a psych:>logist like Freud claims.
Yet the whole psychic ag>aratus of rnerrbers of a class
society, in so far as they do not belong to the nucleus of

of
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privileged people, serves in large measure only to
interiorize or at least to rationalize and supplement
physical coercion. The so-called "social nature" of man,
his self-integration into a given order of things, whether
the ground of this order be pragmatic, moral, or
religious, is essentially reducible to the memory of the
acts of force by which men were made "sociable" and
civilized and which threaten them still if they become too
forgetful.34
It also reveals the knot of contradictions that make fascist
responses the typical human experience.

For example,

the

rage and hatred of civilization typical of a fascist youth
is

not

simply

an

irrational

projection.

It

is more

unsuccessful

but

understandable attempt to overcome

renunciation

of

instinctual

urges

expected

from

an

"the

him.n35

Adolescent revolt is based on the intuition of the wrongness
of class relationships.
What fills the adolescent with distress is, above all, his
dim and confused realization of the close connection or
near-identity of reason, self, domination, and nature. He
feels the gap between the ideals taught to him and the
expectations that they arouse in him oo the one hand, and
the reality principle to which he is corcq;>elled to submit on
the other. His ensuing rebellion is directed against the
circumstance that the air of godliness, of aloofness from
nature, of infinite superiority, conceals the rule of the
stronger or of the smarter.36
The

young

character:

have

two

options

in

their

self-creation

of

either a life of loneliness and confrontation,

the inevitable consequences of their expressions of truth
and passion;

or

one of submission.

Mass acquiescence to

authority gravitates between these two poles of ultimately
meaningless aggression and reconciliation, both of which are
merely

forms

of

self-obliteration.

In this

scheme,

race
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murder demonstrates in its purest form the frustration of
affect, domination, and the absurdity of class.
The rights of man were designed to promise happiness even

to those without power. Because the cheated masses feel
that this promise in general remains a lie as long as there
are still classes, their anger is aroused. They feel
mocked. They must suppress the very possibility and idea
of that happiness, the more relevant it becomes. Wherever
it seems to have been achieved despite its fundamental
denial, they have to repeat the suppression of their own
longing. Everything which gives occasion for such
repetition, however unha:fPY it may be in itself - Anasver
or Mignon, alien things which are reminders of the promised
land, or beauty which recalls sex, or the proscribed animal
which is reminiscent of prorniscui ty - draws upon itself
that destructive lust of civilized men who could never
fulfill the process of civilization.
Those who
spasroodically daninate nature see in a tormented nature a
provocative image of powerless hawiness. The thought of
hawiness without }?Q'fier is unbearable because it would then
be true hawiness. 37
To conclude this review of the intellectual context of
Character Analysis,
Herbert

I

Marcuse's

am going

work

of

the

to note
1930's

some aspects of
and

1940's.

Like

Horkheimer, he views fascism as a general consequence of
social

class,

possibilities

as

a

for

totality

liberation.

which
He

nevertheless

links

signals

liberation

with

absolute ethical values and non-instrumental reason.
A theory of society is rationalist when the practice it
enjoins is subject to the idea of autonomous reason, i.e.
to the human faculty of canprehending, through conceptual
thought, the true, the good, and the right. Within
society, every action and every determination of goals as
well as the social organization as a whole has to
legitimate itself before the decisive judgment of reason
and everything, in order to subsist as a fact or goal,
stands in need of rational justification.38
Bourgeois
viewing

ideology,

human

by

abandoning

freedom as

exercised

autonomous
in

reason

individual

and

market
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decisions

and

their

aggregate

as

natural

mechanisms,

prepares the ideational basis for fascism.
Through this privatization .Qf. reason, the construction of
society in accordance with reason is deprived of the end
which is supposed to provide its goal (just as in
irrationalisrn it is deprived of its begirming through the
functionalization of reason). Thus, precisely the rational
determination and condition of that "generality" in which
the "ha:winess" of the individual is supposed to be
realized is missing. To this extent and only to this
extent) the reproach that liberalism's talk of general
interest or humanity remains caught in µire abstractions is
correct. The structure and order of the whole are
ultimately left to irrational forces: an accidental
"harmony", a "natural balance." The plausibility of
liberalist rationalism thus ceases innnediately when, with
the intensification of social conflict and economic crises,
general "harmony" becomes increasingly improbable. At this
point liberalist theory must grasp at irrational
justifications. Rational critique gives up; it is all too
readily prepared to acknowledge "natural" privileges and
favors. The idea of the charismatic, authoritarian leader
is already preformed in the liberalist celebration of the
gifted economic leader, the "born" executive.39
As an alternative to instrumental reason, Marcuse attempts
to revive the concept of a human essence as constructive of
true rationality. This is a complex of historical memory,
composed

of

suffering,

potentiality,

and

violence,

future

understood as the possibilities for freedom

and happiness
which

domination,

under

capitalism

the advanced productive capabilities

suppresses,

and

the

opportunities

of

activity in the present,

which both redeem the past and

create

most

the

future.

Marcuse is sexual.
imposed

by

The

significant

activity

for

It opposes the habits of renunciation

bourgeois

society,

which

Marc use

names

affirmative culture.
By affirmative culture is meant that culture of the
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bourgeois epoch which led in the course of its own
develcpnent to the segregation from civilization of the
mental and spiritual world as an independent realm of value
that is also considered superior to civilization. Its
decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally
obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that
must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially
different from the factual world of the daily struggle for
existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself
"from within", without any transformation of the state of
fact. It is only in this culture that cultural activities
and objects gain that value which elevates them above the
everyday sphere. Their reception becomes an act of
celebration and exaltation.40
Marc use proposes instead of this cul tu re of abstraction,
privacy,

and

interiorization,

a

concrete,

social,

and

sensuous one.

In Marcuse' s critique, sexual happiness has

an absolutely

subversive nature.

Class

relationships can

only endure as cold spirituality or incomplete, frustrated,
empty forms of gratification. Capitalist society transforms
sensual

pleasure

into

discipline of marriage,

a

bad

instrumentality,

into

the

into procreation for pusposes of

production, into forms of labor.
un?Jrified,
unrationalized
release of sexual
relationships would be the strongest release of enjoyment
as such and the total devaluation of labor for its own
sake. No hl.llilan being could tolerate the tension between
labor as valuable in itself and the freedom of enjoyment.
The dreariness and injustice of work conditions would
penetrate explosively the consciousness of individuals and
make impossible their peaceful subordination to the social
system of the bourgeois world.41
·
The

I want to proceed now to examine Reich's formulation
of the concept of the genital character in relation to all
these contexts - to the tendency of his generation to act
out and project aggression, to the erotic, authoritarian,
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communal idealism of the youth movement,

to the cultural

values of natural forces and undifferentiated action, and to
the psychoanalytic critique of fascism in terms of normative
and

autonomous

ethics

and

liberating energies.

Again,

I

want to suggest that whatever contradictory attitudes inform
Reich's concept,

basic motives of sympathy,

freedom,

and

redemption are suggested by its historical situation and are
signified by the formal qualities of Reich's writing.
In

this

review so

far,

the

genital

character

has

referred to Reich's clinical discovery that his patients'
histories

of

precondition

genital
for

cure;

primacy
to

his

in

childhood

endeavors

to

were

enable

a

his

patients to express themselves biologically, authentically,
from the core of their being, in the autonomic undulations
of orgasm; and to his typology of the character is tics of
plague-ridden versus healthy individuals. Let me cite one
last elaboration of the concept:
The genital character has a solid narcissistic foundation.
In the neurotic character, on the other hand, the feeling
of irnpotence forces the ego to make compensations of a
narcissistic nature. The ccnternporary ccnflicts, permeated
with irrational motives, make it impossible for the
neurotic character to reach rational decisions ••••
Sexually unsatisfied and incapable of being
satisfied, the neurotic character is finally forced either
into asceticism or into rigid monogamy ••••
Upon brief reflecticn, we see that the eIIq?irical
discovery of the above mechanisms becomes the basis for a
revoluticnary critique of all theoretically based systems
of morals. • • • we can briefly state that to the extent that
society makes possible the gratification of needs and the
transforrnaticn of the corresponding human structures, the
mora1 regulaticn of social life will fall away. • • • More
simply expressed, what this all means is that the man whose
sexual as well as primitive biological and cultural needs
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are satisfied does not require any morality to maintain
self-control. But the unsatisfied man, suppressed in all
respects, suffers from mounting inner excitation that would
cause him to tear everything to pieces if his energy were
not partially held in check and partially consumed by
moralistic inhibitions ••••
The discussion of the broader consequences of sexecOJlOOri and the analytic theory of character will not be
able to evade these questions unless, at the sacrifice of
its natural scientific prestige, it prefers to pull in the
reins at the artificially erected boundary between what is
and what should be.42
Noteworthy, here, is the series of identity statements
and implications. These include linking impotence with the
inability

nto

destructive

reach

urges

rational

decisions" 1

monogamy

with

and

sadism
morals1

and
nthe

gratification of needs" and sexuality with social change and
destruction of

the state1

nature with goodness1

integrity of science with the

utopian future.

and the

What

this

signifies is Reich's transformation and integration of a
number of dominant cultural attitudes.

Although built on

clinical evidence, the statements do not represent anything
like empirical

proof.

The

implication

that

monogamy

and

abstinence mechanically produce irrationality might be true
in

certain

case

histories,

but

is

absurd

in

general.

Indeed, the suggestion seems authoritarian, an ironic abuse
of

sexual

tolerance

freedom,
for

a

peculiar

individual

wants,

projection,
needs,

a

lack

and options.

of
His

demand that moral judgment be replaced by behavior regulated
by

sexual drives might

similar

appear

to Volkish appeals

an

extreme mystification,

to nature and

activism.

But

94

considered in the context of other psychosexual critiques of
politics,

a different meaning emerges.

It is clear that

Reich's statements derive from an utopian identity of nature
and reason, the human body and social instincts. Reich has
found

in

reason

his

is

clinical

validated

experience
in

the

hints

that

autonomous

complementary

autonomous

processes of nature and desire. These identities represent
an overcoming of the irrational, dominating aspects of his
milieu, in a linkage of nature and science to a transcendent
reason and goodness.
A brief look at the context of Reich's total oeuvre,
at

~ ~

Psychology .Q.f Fascism, for example - originally

published in 1933 like Character Analysis, and also revised
and

enlarged

into

the

1940's -

makes

clear

that

impulses toward freedom are not only formal ones,

these
locked

inside Reich's language or mode of argument. Reich is often
the most powerful, clear, didactic champion of the broadest
conception

of

freedom.

~

.Mg_§_§

Psychology

is

less

a

clinical work and more a sociological one.

Consequently,

Reich

its

gives

statement

his

here.

basic
~

political

.Mg§§

direction

Psychology

also

clearest

presents

the

reader with a series of identity statements. They are not
merely

formal

didactic

ones,

significations of liberation,
convincing

images

of

a

but powerful

real,

material

liberating activity.
Reich begins with a statistical identity between the
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German

lower

Hitler.

middle

rebelliousness

of

consciousness.

in

needs,

it

it

This

connects

to

middle

support

is

is

a

it

attitude
coupled

family

the

for

in

the

(page

6).

nature

consequently

toward

of
lags

force;

similar

to

identity
and

it

authority

acceptance

~

sociological

authoritarian

in

conservative

formulation,
a

forces

classes.•

childhood,

"ambivolant

submission.•43

social

two-sidedness

against

patriarchal

lower

Formed

an

rebellion

the

this

immediate

includes

Reich

progressive

suggests

behind

the electoral

that there are •not only regressive but also

energetic

Reich

and

He balances this with a consideration reminiscent

of Bataille very

class

the

fillii

Gilbert's,
between

the

authoritarian

state. Sexual repression, bourgeois morality, the father's
discipline,

the

masturbation

and

authoritarian

compulsive

suppression

adolescent

love,

social

system

in

the

all

of

childhood

reproduce

structure

•an

of

its

members.•44 Sexual repression results both in the loss of
self

and

self-confidence

as

well

as

sadistic

habits

of

domination toward oneself and others - honor, duty, bravery,
a whole pattern of violent renunciation.
Reich proposes
this,

and

similar

an
to

identity
Marcuse's,

relationship counter
based

on

free

to

sexual

activity. •sexual desires naturally urge a person to enter
into all kinds of relations with the world, to enter into
close

contact

with

it

in

a

variety

of

forms.•45

These
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subsume love, nature, and social immunity into a pattern of
self-reflecting
pleasure,
reform

and

and

self-generating

freedom.

•will

result

For

example,

spontaneously,

acts

of

rational
if

reason,

measures of

only

the

basic

principle .Qf sexual affirmation and the social protection
of childhood and adolescent sexuality .!.§. adhered to.•46 In
brief,

•to define freedom

is to define sexual health.n47

Like Horkheimer, this habit of identity statements enables
Reich at certain moments
demands

for

freedom.

to express the most unequivocal

nwe

wean

personal and social development,
without

fear,

freedom
freedom

suppression,
development;

in

from
from

short,

the

the

genuine

freedom

of

the freedom to face life
all

forms

reactionary
free

of

economic

inhibitions

of

~-administration

.Q..f

libido.•48
And in the end, this is a real identity of nature and
human psychic life and activity authenticated by the most
utopian demand. "If there should ever be a society in which
all

the cases for

finally

freed om fade

overcome his biological

have achieved genuine freedom.
that

hs

away,

is

fundamentally

and

then man will
social

have

deformity and

Not until man acknowledges

an animal,

will

he be able

to

create a genuine culture.•49
This

is

again

evidence

of

Reich's

basic

intention

throughout his work to establish an absolute, thoroughgoing
identification of nature and

freedom.

And

I

think

it

is
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significant that here, again, Reich imagines this identity
relationship as knowledge that resides in silence1 it is the
soothing of all cries of discontent,
quiet of the final demand for liberation.

the fulfillment

in

CHAPTER IV
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this exercise I have attempted to derive historical
meaning

from

a

problematic

text.

Using

the

formal

strategies of I. A. Richards and Roland Barthes, and the
broadest sense of meaning elucidated in modern historical
methodologies,

I

have

related

a

personal

reading

of

disjunctures in Character Analysis to the general struggle
in

this

century

to

formulate

a

theory

of

liberation.

Meaning emerges from the two-sided nature of Reich's work.
Both his personal sympathies and the edges of his argument those formal indications of liberation which allow freedom
of self-consciousness, discretion for the reader within the
spaces

created

authoritarian

by

contradictions

tendencies

personality. ·In the end,
defy

any

movement

toward

with

the

of

his

own

the eccentricities of

the

text

of

his

age

restrictions,

compete
and

rules

of

proper

discourse, potential for instrumental domination, that may
be

otherwise

present

in

Reich's

theory.

This

becomes

clearest in Reich's concept of genital character, which is
not

so much a list of proper,

restrictive traits,

simple identity of human needs and nature,
autonomous goodness.

itself,

as a
as an
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I began this essay by noting a tendency of historians
to view their work
present.

In

as

illuminated by

conclusion,

I

want

criticism of Reich's legacy.
Michel

In

Foucault explains why

to

~

the

needs

mention

of

a

the

recent

History Qf Sexuality,

Reich's

tactic

of

breaking

through the knot of class contradictions with the weapon of
sexual practices failed over the last half century.
Thus between the two world wars there was formed, around

Reich, the historico--political critique of sexual
repression. The importance of this critique and its impact
on reality were substantial. But the very possibility of
its success was tied to the fact that it always unfolded
within the deployment of sexuality, and not outside or
against it. The fact that so many things were able to
change in the sexual behavior of western societies without
any of the promises or political conditions predicted by
Reich being realized is sufficient proof that his whole
sexual "revolution", this whole "anti-repressive" struggle,
represented nothing more, but nothing less - and its
importance is undeniable - than a tactical shift and
reversal in the great develoµnent of sexuality. But it is
also apparent why one could not expect this critique to be
the grid for a history of that very develoµnent. Nor the
basis for a movement to dismantle it.I
Foucault

seems

to

assert

that

the

secret

to

crucial

relationships of power lies not in the mysteries of the
orgasm, but in the pleasures of language; that sexuality is
not so much a matter of bodies - their functions and nature
- as of ways of talking and imaging; that relationships and
instruments

of

domination

dispersions of knowledge,
erotic

practices.

argument.

By

Reich,

linking

the

remain

in

discourse

and

irregardless of the quality of
I

believe,

concept

of

has

the

better

liberation with an

irreducible, non-discursive core of biologic experience, he

103

preserves

its

integrity

as

a

total

utopian

demand.

Sexuality becomes the domain of unified reason, nature, and
potentiality.

Reich's formulation,

his language,

is a sly

suggestion, a promise unfulfilled; it represents a residue
of

desire

which

subverts

any

reconciliation

formations by signifying a whole new world.

to

class
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